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ٰ ۖ َّهللامُِكلَذِّۚيَحْال َنِمِتِّيَمْال ُجرْخُمَوِتِّيَمْال َنِمَّيَحْال ُجرْخُيۖ ٰىَوَّالن َوِّبَحْال ُِقالَف َّهللاَّنإ َِِ ُُِ 
“Indeed, it is God who causes the seed‐grain and date‐stone to split and sprout. He causes 
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The subject of causality has been a battleground of philosophical speculation dating from the
Hellenistic period to its reception in the Muslim world and development therein. The four 
causes discussed by Aristotle and their concomitant problems were avidly accepted by Muslim
philosophers especially of the peripatetic persuasion who were recipients of Hellenic thought
through the Graeco‐Arabic translation movement. The metaphysic of causation along with 
other problems such as the issue of the eternity of the universe, the problem of universals,
the attributes and knowledge of God or the theory of emanation was of the most important 
philosophical speculation, argumentation and diatribe amongst the falāsifa and 
mutakallimūn. 
The aforementioned philosophical ideas bought to light contentions (or lack of) with the 
revealed cannon of Islam as expressed in the indubitable source of the Qurʾān and Sunnah. 
The canonical sources lay emphasis upon miraculous happenings in human history through
the agency of God or his chosen prophets and the teleological aims of the creator God. I will
be looking at this aspect of the perceived contention between philosophy and revelation in 
the Islamicate tradition. The idea of miracles being an imprint or impact of God in the course
of history that belies reason and natural laws was a reason why empiricists of western 
philosophical thought such as Hume rendered miracles implausible and major theologians as
Ghazālī to castigate the philosophers for their insistence on causal theories that undermine 
scriptural integrity and absolute freedom of God. 
I will provide a detailed discussion on causality as viewed by the Muslim philosophers engaged
with Greek (mainly Aristotelian) theories of causation. I will be making use of Bidāya al Ḥikmah 
of Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī as a reference point for understanding the metaphysics of 
causation in an Islamicate reception. Philosophy in the Islamic world progressed on a 
synthetically and the recent period Ṭabāṭabāʾī lived in represents hitherto, a culmination of 
centuries long discourse and speculation by brilliant Muslim thinkers and philosophers. 
The nature of miracles as presented in the Quran, the scriptural authority for all Muslims. The
definition of a miracle as provided by early philologists and exegetes is presented along with
theological analyses of the nature of miracles as presented by Muslim theologians. A key work
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Introduction 
Ideas and theories have reached us through the positing of questions in a historical setting 
that was responsible for their genesis. Philosophical problems as other ideas, are rooted in 
the melting pot of history. For a robust analysis of the problem of causation to take place, a 
historical insight is necessary to understand its emergence, formulation, synthesis and 
appreciation in the contemporary period. 
The beginnings of causation in Greek thought, the Arabic and subsequently Latin translation 
movements yield a great deal of diversity, ambiguity and nuance. The theological debates such 
as atomism1 and the nature of God in the Islamic milieu prior to the intrusion of Hellenistic 
writings were instrumental in redefining, Islamising and moulding ancient Greek thought to 
accord with Muslim theological assumptions. Causation subsumed under the title of al ῾illah 
wa al ma῾lūl (cause and effect) in modern Arabic philosophical works such as that of Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
2 is considered the most important of debates and a philosophers views on causality have 
ultimately defined the paradigm his philosophical speculation has adhered to. Given the 
fundamentality of the discussion, many hidden assumptions with far reaching assumptions 
are concomitant with the problem such as the idea of the extraordinary in the course of 
natural events, prophetology3, predestination and nature of God. David Hume remarked in 
the opening of his work ‘Treatise of Human Nature’: 
1 A theory discussed by Democrates in Hellenic thought and vigorously promulgated by Mutakallimūn in Muslim
thought. This hybrid thought was debated by Muslim theologians prior to the Graeco-Arabic translation movement 
becoming nuanced with differing groups such as the Baṣran Muʿtazila, the Baghdad Muʿtazila and the Asharites. 
The theory holds that the most basic substance is an atom (liken to a mustard seed in early texts) which is indivisible 
(al juzʾ alladhi la yatajazzaʾ) and it is these atoms which in the milieu of time and space combine to form bodies
and subsequently account for a theory of contingent events. (See Danani, alNoor. The physical theory of Kalām:
atoms, space and void in Basrian Muʿtazilī cosmology. (NY: Brill, 1993) 
2 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Muḥammad Husayn. Bidāya al Ḥikmah.  
Also translated by Qarai, Ali Quli. The elements of Islamic Metaphysics. (London. ICAS Press, 2003) 
3 The claim of prophethood is traditionally vindicated by the rendering of miracles. A popular argument on theories 
of prophetology. (See Ḥillī, Allāma. Sharḥ tajrīd al I’tiqād. (Beirut: Dar al Kutub. 1998)
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“There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty has caused 
more disputes both among ancient and modern philosophers, than this concerning the 
efficacy of the cause, or that the quality, which made them, be followed by their effects.”4 
Causation has come to be regarded as an axiomatic truth by the philosophers that is built upon 
an edifice of necessity5 and theory of everything possessing a nature or essence6. Based on 
these philosophical premises, the theory of knowledge is constructed, since a regularity in 
nature is required to define, name and predicate things, in absence of this the resultant 
irregularity, discontinuity and haphazardness would render all propositions null and void.7 Ibn 
Rushd says in this regard 
“Denial of cause implies the denial of knowledge, and denial of knowledge 
implies that nothing in this world can be really known, and that what is supposed 
to be known is nothing but opinion, that neither proof nor definition exist, and 
that the essential attributes which compose definitions are void”8 
The issue of an event which breaks with the order of nature, signifies discontinuity in the 
natural order and severs the causal nexus by way of a miracle (generally wrought at the hands 
of a prophet in the Qurʾān) was fervently taken up by the Asharite theologian, Abu Hamid 
Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al‐ Ghazālī  (d. 505/1111). Ghazālī  in his famous work, the 
incoherence of the philosophers.9 The work takes the philosophers to task on many doctrinal 
issues, some of lesser importance than others of which three he singles out in his conclusion‐
4 Hume, David. A Treatise on Human Nature: Book 1. Of the Understanding. (London: Biblio Repr. 2008), p 10
5 A famous philosophical principle of Avicenna states ‘mā lam yajib lam yūjad’ ‘that which is not necessitated
does not exist’. This principle of necessity is key in Avicenna’s speculation which assumes a rational regularity 
stemming from Aristotelean assumptions of substances and natures. See Dinānī, Ghulam Hossein. Qawā’id kullī
falsafī dar falsafa e Islāmī. (Tehran: Institute for humanities and cultural studies. 2000), vol1, 282 
6 The Muslim commentators on Aristotle absorbed the theory of Aristotelian substances which undergo change
under the ambit of the four causes and all knowledge reverts back to the why question that appropriates the four 
causes. 
7 Fakhry, Majid. Islamic Occasionalism and its critique by Averroës and Aquinas. (London: Routledge, 2008 
Repr.), p. 5 
8 Ibn Rushd. (Trans. Van den Berg, Simon). Averroes’ Tahāfut al Tahāfut. (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). 
(Oxford: Gibb Memorial Trust. 2016 Repr.) p. 313
9 Ghazālī, Abu Hamid. Tahāfut al falāsifa (the incoherence of the philosopher). (Trans. Marmura, Michael. Utah:
Brigham University Press, 2000)
 
                           
                         
                         
                               
                       
                            
                               
                         
                         
 
                       
                           
                                 
                       
                               
                             
                         
                       
                       
                           
                             
   
 
                               
                           
                                 
                           
                                                 
   
 
 
    
  
cum‐edict as proof of heresy and departure from the fold of Islam10. The seventeenth 
discussion of the incoherence is where Ghazālī tackles the issue of causation under physical 
sciences in a somewhat well intentioned motive to reassert the omnipotence and absolute 
sovereignty of God in the created order in wake of the philosophical notions of causality that 
bind, curtail and obfuscate the Quranic idea of a wilful, autonomous, all‐powerful creator‐
sustainer God. The major concern of Ghazālī is maintaining volition and freedom in the divine 
act11 and hence his repudiation of causality in this sense meant the influence of God was 
unbounded and thoroughly operative in a contingent world. This was the only way Ghazālī 
could restore the logical validity of miracles, an idea referred to as occasionalism. 
The Ghazālian universe and arguable the Asharite‐cum‐Mutakalim universe is a realm of 
contingent events that is, a world of infinitesimal possibility, irregularity in its events and 
abolition of so called defined natures or essences that bind the possibility of events. All of the 
aforementioned ultimately opened up by the 10th century an ‘orthodoxy’ whose ontology, 
epistemology and worldview that was at its core fatalistic as it had divested the cosmic system 
of any efficacy, potency or even existence save God. A fascinating period of Islamic intellectual 
history is the contemporaneous movements of Kalām and falsafa where proponents of both 
currents vied for hegemony each imbued by antecedent heritage, the philosophers rallying 
the freshly incorporated Hellenistic ideas and theologians engaged in physical theories of 
atoms. The eternal universe of Aristotle became the necessary by another of Avicenna and 
the notion of creation in space and time defined the anti‐Aristotelian atomism of the Asharites 
and Muʿtazila.12 
The Quran, regarded in itself as the miracle par excellence, relates many miracle stories in a 
sacred history obtaining from the narratives of past prophets and in concurrence with much 
of what is found in pre Qurʾānic scriptures such as the Old Testament and Torah. Miracle 
stories are considered the strongest proofs for the veracity of prophetic claims and the 
10 Ghazālī issues his ‘fatwa’ on three issues against the philosophers which he regards as tantamount to heresy and
infidelity namely the eternity of the universe, Gods knowledge of particulars and bodily resurrection. (Tahāfut. p. 
226) 
11 Tahāfut (p.21 translators introduction)
12 Sabra, A.I. Kalām Atomism (in Arabic theology, Arabic philosophy, from the many to the one: essays in honour
of Richard M. Frank). (Belgium: Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 2006) p.216
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challenge presented by them is considered to signify the absolute omnipotence of God to act 
with volition that violates any continuous regularity or axiomatic causal nexus. Thus, two 
accounts of rebellion governed Ghazālī’s anti falsafa rhetoric, the unique omnipotent God and 
the contingency of miraculous events that defy natural events. In light of this a miracle can be 
rationally perceived and the scriptural integrity of the Quran maintained13. The debate can, 
from a perspective, be viewed as one over the nature of God, the Asharite‐Ghazzalian in 
contrast to the Avicennan. 
The scope of this analysis is limited to the response of Muslim intelligentsia to causation and 
the intra‐Muslim polemic found therein rather than a broader analysis of causation and/or 
miracles in the Latin world and beyond such as in the writings of Aquinas or Hume. Majid 
Fakhry has masterfully dealt with the issue of Islamic occasionalism and its critique both in 
Arabic (Averroes) and Latin thought (Aquinas).14 
This endeavour will narrow the discussion to the writings on contemporary philosopher‐
exegete, Muḥammad  Ḥusayn  Ṭabāṭabāʾī  (d.1981) who can be considered a modern 
representative of synthetic Islamic philosophical thought. Synthetic in the sense that since the 
Graeco‐Arabic translation movement philosophy in Arabic‐Islamic lands has undergone much 
development and synthesis in the melting pot of history bringing it into contact with other 
disciplines such as theology and mysticism.  Ṭabāṭabāʾī can be considered an inheritor of this 
synthesis notwithstanding the fact that he was amongst the most prominent thinkers of 
philosophy in the modern Muslim world15. The Bidāya al  Ḥikmah (elements of Islamic 
metaphysics) represents a modern approach to the study of Islamic philosophy insofar as it 
presents Islamic philosophy in a mature twentieth century setting having undergone much 
development amidst critiques, censure and inter‐disciplinary refinement. Furthermore, it is 
beneficial to the modern reader of Islamic philosophy by virtue of its analytic composition and 
textbook‐like layout. This differs somewhat to earlier works of authors such as Sabzawārī, 
Dāmād or Ṣadra, which are dense and demanding in prose, dictum and general accessibility 
for one ill acquainted with early Islamic philosophy 
13 Fakhry p.19 
14 Fakhry, p.10
15 Algar, Hamid. ῾Allāma	 Sayyid	Muḥammad	 Ḥusayn	 Ṭabāṭabāʾī: Philosopher, Exegete and Gnostic. (Oxford: 








               
 
 
                             
                           
                         
                             
                               
                           
                     
 
 
                     
 
                         
                               
                               
                                 
                       
               
 
                                                 
 
   
  
     
Chapter One 
The Metaphysics of Causation in Bidāya al Ḥikma 
A general overview of the metaphysics of causality as redacted by Muslim philosophers is a 
prior necessity to any engagement with its repudiation. I will present, in the following 
discussion, the major areas of causality dealt with by  Ṭabāṭabāʾī. These include analyses in 
establishing the principle of causation and it inhering in existence as opposed to quiddity, the 
types of causes, the mutual necessity between cause and effect, the rule of the one, the 
impossibility of infinite regress or circularity in causality, the refutation of chance and further 
analyses on the types of causes (the classic Aristotelian four causes). 
Establishing the principle of Causality and that it inheres in Existence 
Causation is deemed an existential reality (not quidditative) where certain causes bring about 
certain effects and although the relationship is not observed in external reality such as a father 
being the cause of the son, the causal‐nexus is attributed to the observation of this external 
event and its regularity in nature.16 I have looked at the importance of causality in the 
introduction and how according to Muslim philosophers, natural law, logical inferences and 
theoretical understandings are verified by the implied causal‐nexus17. 
16 In the modern context Hume was unable to account for why the regularity of cause-effect events occurred and 
similarly Ghazzālī failed to explain the regularity of causal phenomena. Our discussion is related to the realm of 
philosophy and modern physics in some dimensions does not adhere to the causality as argued by the Greek and
Islamic philosophers.(see Fakhry. p. 3)
17 Obudiyyat, Abd al-Rasul. An Introduction to Islamic Philosophy based on the works of Murtaḍa Mutahhari.
(London: MIU Press, 2012), p. 141 
4 
 
                         
                         
                     
                         
                         
                 
 
                         
                   
                           
                         
                   
                           
                           
                                       
                             
                                 
                             
 
                       
                                 
                                                 
          
   
 
   




       
 
  
    
 
  
Ṭabāṭabāʾī begins the chapter on causation with proofs that establish the principle, he terms 
causation a ma῾na iḍāfī  (relational construct) in the sense the concept of one thing 
necessitates the conception of another. The primary objective is epistemological in 
establishing the principle and thereafter the extension that both cause and effect are 
existential18. Thus, all relational meanings are derivative, mental abstractions that per se do 
not exist in extension, they are a priori schema 
The notion of intellectual derivation or consideration (al I῾ bār al  ῾aqliyyah) is a major 
philosophical discussion systematised by Ṭūsī. These intellectual concepts or mafāhīm (also 
called mā῾qūlāt) are divided into two, primary and secondary. Primary is whatever concept or 
intelligible notion the mind extracts through direct encounter with external reality, thus all 
initial knowledge is derived from sense perception (man faqada  ḥissan faqada  ῾ilman). 
Secondary intelligibles are ideas that are not extracted from external reality directly, they are 
of two kinds, logical and philosophical. Logical secondary intelligibles have no basis in reality 
i.e. the idea of genus, differentia and species etc. have no basis in reality – it is the thinking of 
a third order concept (human) that we get a second order concept (Zayd) and philosophical 
secondary intelligibles have a basis in reality i.e. our idea of a contingent being has come from 
x outside although in terms of contingency qua contingency there is no such thing outside. 
Ghazālī  in the incoherence19 refuted the Aristotelian notion of nature20 (everything has a 
nature that compels it according to it i.e. fire to burn) which the philosophers used in defining 
the heading of the discussion indicates the two-pronged initial approach to18ودجولافيأنھماوالمعلوليةوالعليةإثباتفي 
the problem, Ithbāt is epistemic and thubūt is existential (existential in Islamic philosophy means not inhering in
quiddity or essence but in existence.) 
19 See Marmura. M, Tahāfat. Discussion 17, p 166 – Ghazzālī states “the connection between what is habitually
believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect  is not necessary, according to us. But (with)
any two things, where “this” is not “that” and “that” is not “this” and where neither the affirmation of the one 
entails an affirmation of the other nor the negation of the one entails the negation of the other, it is not a necessity 
of the nonexistence of the one that the other should exist – for example, the quenching of thirst and drinking,
satiety and eating, burning and contact with fire, light and the appearance of sun, death and decapitation, healing
and drinking of medicine, the purging of bowels and use of a purgative. …their connection is due to the prior 
decree of god, who creates them side by side” 
20 A nature implies a predeterminism since a nature delimits potential or contingency, there is a finitude in lieu of
possessing a nature. Thus, the divine is curtailed in his power to act freely. The Asharite argument denied any true
potentiality save in God. This theory appears to be a residue of earlier debates amongst Mu’tazilite circles. (See
Griffel, Frank. Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology. (OUP: Oxford. 2009), p. 125 
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secondary causation. This led to Ghazālī denied causality21 and charged the philosophers with 
heresy stating that such a belief denied the sovereignty and power of God to act directly, 
arguing that causality is arbitrary and habitual as we shall explore further in the third chapter. 
Everything in existence is either a cause or an effect, what is the epistemic justification of this? 
Either the conception and assent are implicit within the preposition, it is empirical or it is 
rational i.e. requires further argumentation to achieve assent. Thus is the law of causation is 
either a posteriori (self‐evident22), empirical or a priori23 – which of the three positions is 
adopted? Asharite occasionalism or extreme gnostic thought says there is no causation, it is 
the will of God. On the contrary, we may have extreme belief in causation. Here, the Imāmī 
position al ʾamr bayn al ʾamrayn (an issue that lies between the two) can be elicited to strike 
a balance between two extremes. 
Bāqir al  Ṣadr attacks the premise  Ṭabāṭabāʾī  relies on (preponderance without a 
preponderator is impossible). He says, the very thing being argued for is incorporated in the 
argument and this leads to circularity. The principle of causality is being used to infer or prove 
causality itself, an evident fallacy according to Ṣadr. Unless we have already assumed for an 
effect to exist without a cause to be impossible we cannot get to the second premise i.e. 
preponderator. Thus,  Ṣadr argues that causality is a self‐evident proposition by virtue of 
presential knowledge24. Thus, inorder to prove the principle, we must invoke the principle 
itself and therefore we argue that the principle of causality is self‐evident. 
21 Correlation is not causation – a valid statement exacted from natural science i.e.: the passing of the bus at the 
same time Zayd leaves his house is not causation rather correlation 
22 Discussed in logic under the five arts – a self-evident proposition is that which has assent intrinsic to its nature. 
See Muḍafar, Muḥammad Rida. Manṭiq. (Qum:  
23 For example a person divested of their 5 senses, will he still assent to cause and effect?
24 See Al Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir (Janābī, Ṭālib. Trans.) . The logical foundations of Induction. (London:
University Press London, 2016) (This argument has already preceded Ṣadr in the tajrīd by Ṭūsī and commented
upon by Ḥillī, it states that just by knowing the definition we assent to it, it is from the primary self-evidentiary 






                                 
                                     
                                   
                                   
                               
                                   
                             
                                     
                           
           
 
                                     
                         
                                   
                                 
                       
                             
                           
                                                 
  
   
 
 





      
      
  
     
  
The concept of Ja῾l 
The concept of jaʿl is a somewhat perplexing one since as there is no agreed upon definition 
of this concept. For example, a carpenter makes a table, he is the cause and the table is the 
effect, what did he cause? The table is the mā῾lūl and the carpenter is the ῾illah, now the 
question here is what the maj῾ūl is25? Such that is it the carpenter imparting or giving to the 
table (what does the cause give the effect?)? The essence of table or existence or something 
else? There is no doubt over the effect and thing caused but the point of controversy here in 
Islamic metaphysical speculation26 is the question of what is being given to the effect? The 
quiddity is being given to the table or its existence or is the quiddity of table being given the 
association with existence (i.e. similar to the Mu’tazilite theorem of ḥāl27 where the quiddity 
already has some degree of instantiation). 
If we say ‘the human exists’ – the ‘human’ is the quiddity and ‘exists’ is the wujūd or existence 
conferred to it. This is the classic essence/existence dichotomy which every existent partakes 
in28. Now, the question arises, when a human being is caused ie mā῾lūl, what is it that the 
cause (῾illah) gives to the mā’lūl? What does God give to the human to become a human? 
Existence, quiddity (form) or an association of quiddity/existence that was already present? 
According to the school that advocates the principality of existence (᾽aṣālat al wujūd) we can 
assert the principality that existence is being given quiddity which is derivative but the 
25 Not to be confused with the ma’lūl – that is agreed upon. The question relates to what is being conferred the 
nature of the ‘making’ ‘fashioning’ or ‘rendering’
26 The subtlety and ingenuity of Islamic philosophers is salient in this discussion regarding the nuance of cause 
and effect in contrast to western philosophy such that encountered in Hume which merely states a cause and effect
argument divorced from the  essence/existence debate lauded by Avicenna. This debate can be considered a
watershed in the development of Hellenic thought in the Arabic/Islamic milieu. 
27 This 
28 For further details see Gutas, D. The Distinction of Essence and Existence in Avicenna’s Metaphysics: The Text 
and Its Context. (In Bertolacci, Amos. Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion. (Leiden: Brill, 20111)), pp 
257-288 and Morewedge, Parviz. Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā's 'Essence-Existence' Distinction. ( Journal
of the American Oriental Society) Vol. 92, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1972), pp. 425-435. Avicenna is renowned for
adducing this distinction which states that everything is a composite of quiddity (essence) and existence and there
is a distinction between the two. God also possesses an essence or quiddity albeit his quiddity is his existence and
vice versa rather than other existents which exist by virtue of existence being superadded to the quiddity (existence
is an accident to quiddity).
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methodology of argumentation here is at variance to these camps of thought since, we are 
not accepting any foundation that will predetermine the conclusion of the argument. The first 
principles are contradictory between the interlocutors and therefore the debate must pay due 
regard to the jihat ul mabnā  (direction based on a particular foundational premise or 
worldview)) and the jihat ul binā29 (based on no foundation rather it is constructing a 
framework of thought from scratch). Thus each of the options must be assessed accordingly 
and they are: 
1. The effect (maj’ūl) of the cause is the existence of the caused thing (mā῾lūl) (anna 
maj῾ūl al illah huwa wujūd al mā῾lūl) 
2. The effect (maj῾ūl) of the cause is the quiddity of the caused thing (anna maj῾ūl al 
illah huwa māhiyyah al mā῾lūl) 
3. The effect (maj’ūl) of the cause is the quiddity of the effect becoming existent 
(anna maj῾ūl al ‘illah huwa ṣayrūrah māhiyyah al mā῾lūl mawjūdatan) 
The issue of foundations and preconceived ideas being set aside in the above discussion is 
important because the issue regarding principality of existence or quiddity is more general, 
being applicable to issues beyond causation. Thus, the discussion of jaʿl is solely based around 
the issue of causation albeit with overlap regarding the principality of existence or quiddity. 
In addition, the issue of principality (ʾaṣālah) is applicable to both contingent and necessary 
beings whereas the concept of jaʿl is purely connected to contingent agents. 
Jaʿl30 is of two types 
1. Jaʿl al basīṭ ‐ simple rendering – there is one maker such as the statement in the 
Qurʾān in reference to God announcing the making of a vicegerent, innī jā῾ilun fi 
al ʾarḍi khalīfah (‘Indeed, I am making a vicegerent in the Earth’)31 
29 Al Ḥaydarī, Sayyid Kamāl. Sharḥ nihāyat al Ḥikmah. (Qum: Mu᾽assassa al Jawād, 2007), vol 2 p 42 
30 maṣdar – transitive verb – requires a direct object
31 Qur’an (5:97) 
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2. Jaʿl al murakkab – complex rendering – the thing made is made in a certain way 
that it has multiple renderings i.e. Jaʿala Allah al ka῾bata al bayt al ḥarāma 
qiyāma (the Qurʾānic verse which states ‘God made the Ka῾ba a sacrosanct 
sanctuary and .What was made first? Was it made a sacrosanct sanctuary and 3rd 
made alongside or after? Ṣadra says all forms of complex jaʿl can only apply to a 
thing and its detachable accidents (a῾rāḍ al mufāraqah) that can be separated 
from a thing. These are the maḥmūlāt bi ḍamīmah (attached or accidental 
predications) that are non‐essential accidents (not ṣamīmah (which are from the 
essentia (dhātī) as discussed in the Isagoge of Porphyry, no independent 
existence between subject/object is assumed in this type of predication such as 
rationality in humans is an essential accident in contrast to something non‐
essential such as a wall painted blue). Therefore jaʿl can only occur to detachable 
accidents not the essential accidents since they are already possessed and 
acquired that which is already possessed is absurd32. This is first place where a jaʿl 
cannot work i.e. between a thing and itself (e.g. human human). The second 
place jaʿl cannot work is a thing and its essentia (i.e. rationality to human) and 
thirdly between a thing and its inseparable accidents. Thus we may ask, is a 
māhiyyah (quiddity) part of the essence or accident of a thing? The answer in 
light of the preceding discussion is that by definition jaʿl cannot be māhiyyah 
since tahṣīl al ḥāṣil muḥāl (that which is already possessed cannot be acquired 
again) – therefore ‘al maj’ūl huwa al māhiyyah’ (the made thing is the quiddity) is 
invalidated by the above Ṣadrian argument33 
Avicenna in a famous attribution quoted by Lāḥījī  states “mā  jaʿala Allah al mishmishah 
mishmishatan bal awjadaha” (God did not make an apricot an apricot rather he gave it 
existence)34. The statement can be inferred to mean that the causative agent (God) conferred 
existence to the apricot rather than make it an apricot, a subtle distinction is present here by 
32 Tahṣīl al ḥāṣil laghw – see Dinānī, Ghulām Hossein. Qawā’id kulli. vol 2. p.234 
33 Shīrāzī, Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. Asfār. (Tehran: Sadra Islamic philosophy research institute
publications. 2015), vol. 3 p. 144
34 Lāhijī, ῾Abd al Razzāq. Shwāriq al ilhām fi sharḥ tajrīd al kalām. (Qum: Mu᾽assassa Imam Sadiq, 2012), vol 2.




                                   
                           
                         
                        
 
                               
                                   
                         
                         
                             
                                   
                             
                                     
                             
                       
 
 
                         
                             
                       
                             
                                 
         
 
                             
                           
                                     
                                 
                           
usage of the verb ‘give existence’ since one cannot make an apricot an apricot as it would be 
acquiring that which is already possesses rather the quiddity (a contingent entity) is given 
existence. Various groups of different philosophical leanings have argued on the purport of 
this statement attributed to Avicenna in light of their own foundational biases. 
The relationship between cause and effect is a real relationship and every effect of a specific 
kind must come from a specific cause i.e. fire and heat. Each of these individually can be the 
cause/effect of the other one without such interconnectivity there would be arbitrary causes 
for anything and everything e.g. clapping causes pregnancy. However the quiddity is always 
regarded in and of itself as nothing but itself (neither existent nor non‐existent ‐ al māhiyyah 
min haythu hiya hiya laysat illa hiya), the quiddity in and of itself is indifferent, it has no 
relationship to anything and thus cannot be attributed with cause or effect. If the māhiyyah 
was the cause of the jaʿl then it must be indifferent in a particular way and this is contradictory 
since it cannot be conceptualised except as an indifferent thing that has no predilection or 
preponderance to anything other than an indifferent state to both existence and non‐
existence. 
The third option (anna maj’ūl al ‘illah huwa  ṣayrūrah māhiyyah al maʿlūl mawjūdatan) is 
disproven on the basis that anything relative (᾽iḍāfī) is of the ᾽umūr nisbiyyah (derivative or 
relative principles) which are abstractions and considerations, not fundamental. The cause is 
considered a bestower of existence to the effect, causality is a representation of this concrete 
reality of giving existence to a quiddity, a so called tipping of the scale, moving an indifferent 
quiddity to existence or being. 
What can be gleaned from this discussion is that a key distinction between intellectual analysis 
or consideration and the extra‐mental reality must be maintained to avoid confusion as to 
what the causal nexus actually implies given that we have a cause (x), a receiver (y), an act of 
giving and the actual thing given (i.e. what is given by the cause to the effect? Existence, 
quiddity or processual relation that moves a quiddity to existence). Thus, intellectually we can 
10 
 
                                   
                             
 
       
 
                         
                       
                   
                   
 
                               
                                     
                               
                               
 
                             
                                 
                               
                               
                                 
                         
                                 
                             
                           
       
                                                 
    
      
  
 
    
   
draw distinctions and parts but in reality the effect is bestowed with existence and it is in sheer 
need35 of the cause (ultimately the causal nexus involves the cause, its action and relation. 
The Types of Causes 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī, begins with the four Aristotelian causes, the efficient, formal, material and final 
cause. Further divisions have also been discussed by the Muslim philosophers, some 
subsumed under the Aristotelian causes.  Ṭabāṭabāʾī discusses these general causes prior to 
analysing the Aristotelian causes in more detail under separate sub‐headings.36 
The term cause can be considered in a general sense which is the unqualified dependence of 
a thing upon it be it for existence or otherwise. It can also be considered in a specific sense 
where the relationship is one where the cause gives the effect existence. The section in Bidāya 
entitled ‘the divisions of cause’ (inqisāmāt al ʿilla) refer to the general sense of the term cause. 
A cause can be complete (tāmah) or incomplete (nāqiṣah) and they are both mutual and 
disparate in certain aspects. If either of these causes is absent, the effect is absent based on 
the axiom ‘ʿadam al  ʿilla ʿillatun tāmah li ʿadam al maʿlūl’ (nonexistence of a cause is a 
complete cause for the nonexistence of the effect)37. A cause of either type is necessary for 
an effect. The absence of a complete cause means the absence of the requisite factor (s), the 
conditions and absence of impediments. Similarly the absence of an incomplete cause implies 
part of the cause is present with other parts absent such as moisture being an impediment for 
combustion. The two causes differ on the basis of their relationship with the effect, existence 
of a complete cause necessitates the effect whereas this necessary relationship does not occur 
with the incomplete cause38. 
35 This is what Sadrian commentators call the ‘existential need’ of the effect and is related to the concept of imkān 
al faqrī (derived from the Qur’anic verse 35:15) as expounded by Mulla Sadra (d. 1640) in his transcendent
philosophical system. Rather than the essential contingency of Avicenna (imkān māhawī), Sadra proposed a 
contingency in the sense of dependence or impoverishment to an independent Being in a ‘reality of existence 
(ḥaqīqah al wujūd) schema. See Shīrāzī, Sadr al-Din. Al Asfār al arbaʿa al aqliyyah. (Lebanon: Dar al-kutub, 
2010) vol.1 p. 46. Rizvi, Sajjad. Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being. (London: Routledge, 2009) 
p. 240 
36 Bidāya. p.111 
37 Ibid. p. 110 




                               
                         
                             
                         
                             
                             
                           
                               
                                     
       
 
                         
                         
                           
                           
                  
 
                           
                           
                             
                             
      
 






A cause can be singular (wāḥidah) where the effect can only emanate from this cause or 
multiple (kathīrah) where numerous causes acting as substitutes can cause the same effect 
such as heat being generated both by fire and the sun. Proximate (qarībah) causes have 
intermediary between the effect and distal (baʿīdah) causes do have intermediaries. They can 
also be internal (dākhiliyyah) that consist of matter and form or genus, species and differentia 
(they constitute a things quiddity and are termed the formal and material causes) or external 
(khārijiyyah) which are the efficient and final cause, these are existentiating causes (ʿilal al 
wujūd). The efficient cause gives existence (al mufīḍah lil wujūd), a thing exists by it (mā bihi 
al wujūd). The final cause is the loftiest station for the existence of an effect, it is its raison 
d’etre (mā liajlihi al wujūd). 
Causes can be simple (basīṭah) or composite (murakkabah). These terms can have manifold 
connotations, composite can be extramental (matter and form) or mental (genus, species and 
differentia) or essence and existence (such as a contingent being), simple causes lack the 
aforementioned types of composition in either intension or extension. God is the simplest of 
entities as he lacks all conceivable forms of composition. 
The final general division of causes is real (ḥaqīqiyyah) and preparatory (muʿiddah). As the 
name specifies, real causes actually bestow existence to the effect and preparatory causes are 
figurative causes that prepare the real cum concrete cause to cause the effect. They prepare 
prime matter for the reception of concrete forms from the giver of forms (wāhib al ṣuwar),39 
who is God.40 
39 See Davidson, H.A. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active 
Intellect. (Oxford: OUP, 1992), p. 74-83. The theory of a hierarchy of intellects has its antecedent in Aristotle (the
first teacher) and initial promulgation in Muslim thought with Farābī (the second teacher) and subsequently 
Avicenna. The giver of forms or the active intellect is the culmination of the hierarchy of intellects or intelligences 
on the cosmological emanative descent from pure being to corporeality. Neoplatonic thought ascribes this realm 
to the moon (qamar), the Islamic philosophical tradition would say this is the Holy Spirit or Gabriel (the
intelligences are reconciled with scripture by asserting they are abstract beings or angels and the celestial orbs are 
interpreted from verses that use inanimate pronouns). The active intellect units the human and physical realm with
the abstract immaterial realm (to which God belongs essentially as he is regarded an intellect by peripatetic 
philosophers). 





                           
                           
                             
                               
       
 
                             
                           
                   
                                 
                           
                         
                               
                           
                           




                       
                                   
                               
                                   
                                                 
 
  
    
  
   
   
  
   
  
The Efficient Cause 
The efficient cause, along with the final cause, constitutes the most important discussions in 
causality. Both the aforementioned causes are known as ‘existential causes’ (ʿilal al wujūd) in 
contrast to the material and formal causes which are constitutional causes (ʿilal al qiwām). An 
object comes into being through a thing (shayʾ), the efficient cause and ‘for the sake of 
something’, the final cause41. 
Avicenna and Farābī both held efficient causes in higher realms to be causes for the existence 
of everything in an emanative scheme, albeit in slight variation42. Early Islamic models of 
cosmology were based on Ptolemaic geocentric model. Farābī  explained the emanative 
schema on this basis with God being the first principle who emanates a series of ten intellects, 
whom through their own intellection yield orbs or heavenly spheres that finally culminate with 
the realm of generation of corruption, namely, the human, animal, plant, mineral kingdoms. 
God’s creative activity is mediated by the intellects referred to as ‘secondary causes’, it is these 
causes which are responsible for the creation of the world43. Notwithstanding the debates on 
the number and nature of celestial orbs or intellects, subsequent peripatetic thought in the 
works of Avicenna did not veer notably from this basic schema to any significant degree44. 
The Formal cause 
This is inferred from the general definition of cause45 (mā yatawaqqafu alayhā al shayʾ that 
upon which a thing relies upon) and is defined as mā bihi al shayʾ huwa huwa bil fi῾l (that which 
makes a thing what it is in actuality). From the five substances (intellect, soul, body, matter, 
form), body is the only substrate that has both the formal and material cause by virtue of its 
41 Fakhry. p. 96 
42 See Khalil, Atif, 'Some Tensions in Farabi's Metaphysics of the One and the Emanative Descent', Transcendent
Philosophy 1: 83–108, esp. n. 8 and Janos, Damien. Method, structure and Development in al Farabi’s cosmology.
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), p 93
43 Janos. p 90-110 
44 Griffel, F. p. 136 
45 We discussed that there are two causes for wujūd and they are fāʿil (ma minhu al wujūd- that which existence 
derives from) and ghāyah (ma liajlihā al wujūd- the ratio for the existence of a thing). For qiwām (constitution) 
we have two further causes, ṣūrah or form (ma bihi al wujūd- that by which existence is) and mādah or materia 
prima (mā fīhi al wujūd- that which existence inheres in). For further details see Al Ḥaydarī, Sayyid Kamāl. Sharḥ
nihāyat al Ḥikmah. (Qum: Mu᾽assassa al Jawād, 2007) under the chapter of ‘types of causes’ 
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composition. The type of comparison will dictate what cause is being referred to such as in 
relation to matter, it is form and a participant in the efficient cause. It is important to note 
that form (surah) has multiple meanings and it is important to bare this in mind. The 
relationship between matter and form is of much debate amongst philosophers, are they 
wujūdāt inḍimāmī  (appended existents) or wujūdāt ittihādī  (unified existents)? Old 
peripatetics held they were appended (inḍimāmī) i.e. are combined. However Suhrawardī 
argued that they are one and the same and the difference is elaborated in light of intension 
and extension46. 
The Material Cause 
This is the matter which is the source of potentiality and the form is the source of actuality. 
There are 2 types of matter – materia prima and secondary matter, the former cannot exist 
on its own and the latter is a body (composite of matter (primary) and form47 (a substance)). 
With respect to secondary matter and beyond these are called so because they receptive to 
new forms (anything beyond prime matter is called secondary matter and is by definition a 
body). The potentiality associated with matter is a state of possession and lack (wijdān and 
fiqdān) and this is an imperfection, therefore it needs a cause for actualising its potentiality 
(fāqid al shayʾ  lā yumkin  ʿan yakūn mu῾ yyan lahu – a thing that does not possess cannot 
give)48. Another argument for material cause is according to the principle that nothing will 
exist until it is necessitated, matter lacks necessity therefore how can it proffer necessity to 
another? Thus, there must be something beyond matter that necessitates the thing and brings 
it into existence49. Denial of the above i.e. denial of the nexus of necessity between cause and 
effect, would invalidate the law of causality and would be akin to saying ‘anything causes 
anything’, this is beyond that which has been established by self‐evident argument. 
46 Bidāya. p. 122 
47 Bidāya. p.122 
48 The materialists would argue for change and deny causality here by restricting causation to matter denying any 
teleological or efficient cause. 
49 Modern physics especially quantum theory poses a contrasting philosophy to the metaphysics being presented 
here. For a clear and succinct exposition of early cosmological doctrines to modern scientific cosmogony see 







                           
                           
                           
                                 
                                 
                             
                                 
                               
                           
                 
 
                             
                                 
                           
                           
                                     
                                                 




   
   
 
    
The Final Cause50 
The most important discussion in the metaphysics of causation especially in a modern context 
of materialism that negates all theories of design, purpose or intelligence that ultimately lead 
to supreme being/cause beyond the phenomenal universe. The final cause or purpose for an 
agent i.e. its final end and raison d’etre for acting. Mulla Ṣadra says this discussion is of the 
most worthy of discussions in metaphysics51. If one of the causes does not exist the cause will 
not exist and a principle of causation/being is ‘absence of ghāyah necessitates the absence of 
the effect’. How is this correlation proved? The very fact we can prove the existence of things 
then we prove the existence of ghāyah52. The next question herein is, does ghāyah exist? Here 
we need to substantiate motion (a movement from potential to actual – the metaphysical 
definition that is linked to natural motion i.e. locomotion).
 Ṭabāṭabāʾī states ghāyah is the ultimate perfection – these are of two types: First, all the 
perfections that can be had in potentia by a thing according to its nature e.g. rationality and 
animality for humans and second perfection and Second, that which is possessed in actuality 
(i.e. possibility is possessed and actuality are both possessed)53. Motion is a first perfection, 
how? Motion is a process of actualising a potential (that is in a state of actuality in the agent 
50 The efficient and final cause are subject to much debate especially when the background of Neoplatonism
which emphasises the efficient causative agency of God at the helm of the Plotinian emanative scheme and the 
Aristotelian scheme of motion towards the ultimate purpose of being i.e. god. In the Islamic world, the 
peripatetics have assimilated both doctrines accordingly, hence we see a Neoplatonist superstructure amongst 
which Aristotelian ideas are well accommodated. R. Wisnovsky and D Gutas have examined the ubiquity of both 
systems in Avicenna’s philosophy concluding that he considered himself a worthy heir of Aristotle in the 
Muslim world in addition to his receptivity to Neoplatonic thought. This is reflected in the high regard and 
propriety for both causes in his cosmology, theology, epistemology and metaphysics. See Wisnovsky. R. Final 
and efficient causality in Avicenna’s cosmology and theology. (Journal of the History of Metaphysics. DOI:
10.1484/J.QUAESTIO.2.300461. pp. 97-124
51 Asfār. vol 4 p. 211
52 The logical syllogism of modus Tollens here (qiyās ithtisnā᾽ī) states – law lam takun al ghāyah mawjūdah 
lamā wujida al f’il – lakinna al fiʿl mawjūdah = al ghāyah mawjūdah. ‘if the purpose was not existent then the 
act would not exist, the act exists therefore the purpose exists’ 
53 Bidāya. p.123 
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i.e. possessed – the 1st perfection) when the process of motion stops54, we have the 2nd 
perfection. The nature of motion is such that there is change and process, this yields purpose, 
there must be a desideratum that is possible to obtain 55(mumkin al  ḥuṣūl). Motion is with 
respect to a particular ghāyah. The first perfection is sought inorder to obtain the 2nd 
perfection. Thus, motion is an existential fact, we move because we believe something exists 
for us to move towards it and necessarily propose or ghāyah is an existential fact. Movement 
is a process of change from potential to actuality, imperfection to perfection and non‐
existence to existence. Therefore, it only applies to contingent agents not the necessary being, 
however, the question arises, if God (necessary being) is in a state of complete perfection then 
what is his ghāyah? the Asharites argue there is no purpose to the act of God due to the 
aforementioned statement not due to the blameworthiness of no‐purpose rather because 
there is no praise or blame here (i.e. acting without purpose is blameworthy which the 
Asharites disagree with). 
Acts are of 2 types, those undergoing motion and those not undergoing motion. The former 
has been under discussion hitherto and the latter is something to be elaborated upon. In 
metaphysics matter (not physical but the possessor of potential) undergoes change but what 
about other substances such as the active intellect? Here, we have an agent who is never in 
potentiality i.e. always in actuality since it is divested of the concomitants of matter, thus, the 
active intellect is not in motion. We now are obliged to prove that every agent has a purpose 
even the sedentary agents such as the necessary being or the active intellect. The statement 
‘li kulli fā῾il ghāyah’ as a general conclusion can be proven when we prove its sub‐branches – 
agents in motion (natural and intellectual) and agents not in motion. In relation to God, how 
can a necessary being contain anything within it that is contingent (purpose denotes 
contingency)? Prima facie, the Asharites hold a more tenable position since they deny purpose 
54 The potential for movement can be infinite but not actual rather potential so motion does not stop absolutely 
rather, it stops when a particular purpose is fulfilled and many more may exist. (as Iqbal the poet says ‘maqāmāt 
e āh o fughān aur bhi hein’ – there are many more stations of exasperation and delight)) 
55 This debate has major repercussions in philosophical mysticism and ethics – the peripatetics say there are 4 
categories in which motion can occur (quantity, quality, posture, place) – the school of ibn arabi and Sadra states 
motion can occur in substance not accidents (4 according to peripatetics who accept change in substance but only 
at level of kawn wa al fasād – creation and destruction so not the same thing). In contrast Sadra et al state the 
movement in substance has grades such as strength and weakness/precedence etc. based on the theory of 
modulation (tashkīk). Thus, the Sadrian notion stands at odds with the Aristotelian notion of substance (ousia) 
and his Muslim commentators i.e. Avicenna et al. 
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in act, arguing purpose is whatever God wills as a voluntary agent56. Inorder to uphold the 
principle that ‘every agent has a purpose’ we must prove that moving and non‐moving agents 
both are bound by purpose. Thus far, our intuition and observation has led to the conclusion 
that all material/natural agents (fāʿil ṭabīʿī) are in motion due to the fact that they move from 
potentiality to actuality and therefore must have a telos, a purpose to move. What is the 
principle of its motion? Why is it moving? The philosophers draw upon the nature of that thing 
(tabī’ah)57 – it is the very active force or agent of causation here and this is the form of a thing 
– the principle of its motion and actuality (ṣūrah naw’īyyah) and the matter is the principle of 
potentiality. For natural agents this type of cause/possibility is called al imkān al ist῾dādī 
(preparatory possibility)58 
With regards an intellectual agent (fāʿil ῾ilmī) the philosophers say it is ‘alladhi li ʿilmihi dakhlun 
fi fiʿlihi’ (knowledge is present in the act through will and it is part of the process). Thus, there 
is self‐induced motion by a wilful agent spanning the stages of concept‐assent regarding the 
benefit of movement, this leads to excitement (shawq) and movement towards the fulfilment 
of the benefit. The ‘will’ or ‘motivation;’ here is the preponderator and the ghāyah (purpose) 
is the benefit conceived. With regards God, the preponderator is nothing but his own will 
(irādah). Avicenna remarks ‘al ghāyah mutaqaddim bil taṣawwur, mutaʾakkhirun bil taṣdīq’ 
(‘purpose is first in respect to concept and last in aspect of assent’)59. For example, if a group 
purpose a building, they are potential agents not actual, the material or design is potential, 
are they actual agents/causes for the building/usage of materials/effecting the design? No, 
they will only be so after the end or ghāyah has been finalised in concept (taṣawwur) and then 
the assent (taṣdīq) will occur of the ghāyah. Avicenna further states inna al ῾illah al ghā᾽īyyah 
hiya ῾illatun fā῾illiyatun li fāʿiliiyah al ghāyah’ – the agent needs a reason to act and without 
such it is a potential agent not an actual agent, a cause can be both an existential cause to 
make a an agent an agent is the cause of purpose. The catalyst in the final analysis is the ̔ illah 
56 Hourani, G. Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p 20 
57 The issue of a nature is fundamental to Aristotelian and peripatetic thought. This notion is denied by the 
theologians such as Asharites and ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE) who consider such a notion as a compromise on 
the nature of God since essential nature restrict, limit and bind activity and possibility. For further clarity on how 
ibn Taymiyya rebutted Aristotelian substance based ontology and developed a distinct vocabulary in comparison 
to Ghazālī see Hallaq, Wael. Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)
58 Bidāya. p. 55 
59 Sina, Abu Ali ibn. Al-Shifā: Ilāhiyyāt. (Bierut: Mu᾽assassa  Tarīkh al ‘arab, 2007)
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al ghā᾽īyyah – this final cause drives causation and without it there would be no causes or 
agents and thus no acts and thus nothing would be. We can sum the definition of the final 
cause as such ‘al fā῾il kull mā yufīd al wujūd ila ma῾lūl’ (the final cause is that agency which 
gives existence to the effect)60 this either bil quwwah or bil fi῾l. Ṭūsī further clarifies the notion 
by saying mental existence of the ghāyah is prior to the extra‐mental existence of the 
ghāyah61 .
 Ṭabāṭabāʾī argues against this on basis of 2 types of agent (natural and intellectual) – he says, 
how can the principle be generalised to natural/material agents as they lack a soul and do not 
undergo concept and assent. He argues further that even for intellectual agents the principle 
advocated by Avicenna is false since a weaker existence cannot create a stronger existence so 
how can wujūd zihnī (mental existence) create wujūd khārijī (extramental existence) which is 
stronger/more perfect and real62. Ṭabāṭabāʾī states: 
“It is its ultimate perfection (kamāl) towards which the agent is oriented in its action. If the 
agent’s knowledge has a role in its efficiency, the end is the agent’s purpose. Alternately, one 
may say that his purpose is for the sake of reaching the end. Hence, it is said that end precedes 
action conceptually but follows it externally. But if knowledge has no role in the agent’s 
efficiency, the end is that in which the action ultimately terminates. To explain, a things 
perfection has a permanent relationship with it, and it requires that perfection. Restraining it 
from acquiring that requirement of its nature either always (via a permanent restraint) or 
through most of its lifespan (a major restraint) contradicts divine providence, which makes 
every contingent attain the perfection requisite for it. Thus, everything has an end that is the 
ultimate perfection it requires. As to a minor restraint (which hinders the attainment of 
perfection for a portion of a things existence), it is a minor evil that is compensated by an 
abundance of good. Moreover, this restraint, in the case it is present, occurs only in the 
material realm due to disparate conflicting factors”63 
60 Bidāya. p. 120 
61 Ṭūsī, Nasir al-Din. Sharḥ al Ishārāt wa al tanbihāt. (Bierut: Mu᾽assassa Tarīkh al ‘arab, 2000) 
62 Bidāya. p.118 
63 Ṭabāṭabā᾽ī. p. 75 (trans. Qarai) 
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The Bodily Cause 
These type of causes have limited efficacy from the viewpoint of number, duration and 
existential intensity (of the effects they can produce). By substantial motion a new cause is 
acquired to achieve a higher state of being with greater efficiency64. 
The metaphysicians hold that bodily species are in substantial motion (al  ḥarakah al‐
jawhariyya) 65 hence their specific forms and faculties are divisible and analysable into limits 
and stages, each of which is bracketed by two non‐beings. They are finite in themselves as 
well as in their external effects. Also, bodily causes do not act without there being a special 
configuration between them and the matter of the thing affected. The metaphysicians state 
that since the bodily cause needs matter for its existence, it also needs matter for bringing 
something else into existence. Its need for matter in bringing into existence lies in its attaining 
through matter a special position in relation to the thing affected. Hence proximity and 
remoteness and special configurations interfere in the effectiveness of bodily causes. 
The Theory of Necessity 
This gained notoriety with Avicenna who stated that inorder for anything to exist it must 
become necessary albeit necessary by another rather than essentially necessary.66 It has been 
of debate amongst the proverbial rivals, theologians and philosophers but also the Jurists in 
64 Bidāya. p.123 
65 The theory of trans-substantial motion is amongst the foundations of Sadrian ontology. The theory, in brief,
marks a departure from traditional Aristotelian-Avicennan theories of motion where the motion is occurring in
accident rather than substance. In Sadra’s framework the motion occurs in the very ground of being, the
substance (jawhar). This debate has major repercussions in philosophical mysticism and ethics – the peripatetics 
say there are 4 categories in which motion can occur (quantity, quality, posture, place) – the school of ibn arabi
and Sadra states motion can occur in substance not accidents (four according to peripatetics who accept change 
in substance but only at level of kawn wa al fasād – creation and destruction so not the same thing). In contrast 
Sadra et al state the movement in substance has grades such as strength and weakness/precedence etc. based on 
the theory of modulation (tashkīk). Thus, the Sadrian notion stands at odds with the Aristotelian notion of 
substance (ousia) and his Muslim commentators i.e. Avicenna et al. (see Rizvi. S. Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics) 
66 Marmura, M. Probing Islamic philosophy: studies in the philosophies of Ibn Sina, Al-Ghazal and other major 
Muslim Thinkers. (New York: SUNT, 2005); Gutas, D. Avicenna and the Aristotelean tradition. Leiden. Brill, 
2015), Wisnowsky. R. Avicenna’s metaphysics in context (London: Duckworth, 2003); Adamson, Peter. 
Interpreting Avicenna. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)
19 
 
                           
                         
             
 
                               
                         
                           
                           
                       
                             
                                 
                           
                       
                         
              
 
                             
                         
                   
                               
                                   
                               
                                                 
   
  
   
  
 
    
   
    
  
    
 
 
Uṣūl al fiqh debates where the idea of necessity impinged on debates surrounding ethical 
propositions and value judgements that ultimately influenced theories on natural law and the 
efficacy of independent reason in forming Sharʾī precepts.67 
A philosophical principle states, ‘A thing which is not made necessary, will not exist’, (al shay 
mā lam yajib lam yūjad).68 This principle cum theory was rejected by Ghazālī’s ‘no‐necessary 
connection’69 thesis and Asharite theologians who maintained that God is not bound by any 
necessity imposed upon him that results in a limited, incapable and choice‐less deity. The 
philosophical position most notably championed by Avicenna argues that once the exigent 
factors are present and impediments are absent, a cause will, by necessity, yield the effect 
which is intrinsic to its nature. For example, fire will definitely, by necessity burn when all the 
requiring factors for combustion are present and impediments such as lack of oxygen or 
moisture are absent. The re‐evaluation of modal principles, especially the modal ‘necessary’ 
is a salient feature of causal metaphysics initially promulgated by Avicenna and generally 
accepted by post‐Avicennan philosophers such as Ṭabāṭabāʾī in Bidāya. 
The debate on necessity is closely linked to the nature of God, The essentially necessary 
existent70, distinct from the contingent existents reliant upon his being. In explicating the 
emanative scheme (something rejected by the Asharites/Occasionalists), Avicenna states that 
the first intellect, which is the first and immediate effect of God, is necessary. This necessity 
of producing the first intellect is borne out of the idea that a necessity being must by definition 
be necessary from all aspects (wājib al wujūd bi dhāt wājib al wujūd min jamīʿ al jihat)71, 
67The divine command theory as it is known in western literature can be considered a hallmark of Asharite 
ethical theories, the Mu’tazilites and Imāmiyya have provided contrasting views more clement to rational
judgements and their binding nature. Rational good and bad’ known as al husn wa al qubḥ al aqliayn is an arena
of frenetic debate straddling multiple sciences such as ethics (moral judgements), law (the idea of benefit and 
harm in legal precepts), philosophy (is God bound by rational laws or not?), theology (the justice of God is 
dictated by rational good or bad) and spirituality. See Bhojani, Alireza. Moral Rationalism. (Routledge: Oxford, 
2012), Muḍafar, Muḥammad Rida. Uṣūl al Fiqh. (Beirut: Turāth Arabi, 2006) and Emon, Anver. Islamic natural 
law theories. ( 
68 Dinānī. Qawā’id Kullī. vol 1 p. 124 
69 Hume, in the latter Western philosophical tradition speaks of causation in a similar vein. Defining it as a 
habitual or customary connexion that is not logical nor metaphysical. See Clatterbaugh, Kenneth. The Causation 
Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637-1739. (Oxford: Routledge, 2014), p. 195 
70 Avicenna differentiates other necessary existents such as the first intellect in his emanative schema by stating
the necessary existent can be either essential (wājib al wujūd bi dhātihī) or made necessary by another (wājib al
wujūd bi ghayrihī) 
71 Dinānī. vol 2 (under w) 
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namely, knowledge, power, will and the other attributes of God. Thus, the logical conclusion 
drawn is that God’s ability to act as an agent is necessary by his own nature and that 
necessitates being a causative agent, hence the first intelligence is necessary too albeit made 
necessary by another i.e. God (bighayrihī). The necessity (wujūb) in the nature of God is self‐
obligated or internally emanates within the divine nature rather than externally (wujūb ʿala) 
which would imply compulsion or it is a choice between others (wujūb lahu) thereby implying 
contingency72. Thus the principle of ‘A thing which is not made necessary, will not exist’ 
alluded to earlier is necessitated by a volitional agent who acts by necessity through an 
internally emanated necessity. This acts as the volitional agent throughout the cosmological 
scheme of emanation with all intermediary causes being merely preparatory or connective. 
Antagonists of this theorem failed to grasp this subtle point when making the conclusion that 
necessity implies compulsion (al wujūb yusāwiq al iḍṭrār) and thereby, a God who lacks 
volition (fāʿil mujbar). 
The Principle of the One 
This principle argues that there must me a mutual affinity or conformity (sinkhiyyah) between 
the cause and the effect that is unique to only that singular cause‐effect nexus. The principle 
states ‘None issues from the One but One’ (la yaṣdur min al wāḥid illa’ al wāḥid).73 The affinity 
or conformity in the causal nexus means a particular cause produces a particular effect 
otherwise an anarchic situation would result where any cause would produce any random 
effect74 and vice versa such as shaking a bottle of water produces cheese. 
72 Al Ḥaydarī, Sayyid Kamal. Sharḥ Bidāya al Ḥikmah. (Qum: Mu᾽assassa al Jawād, 2007)
73 This principle has its roots in Avicennan philosophical cosmology that is grounded in Plotinian cosmogony. 
This principle is amongst other principles according to which the manifestation of the cosmos takes place. Pure
being is the only independent order of reality that is one, unique, simple and uncompromised in its oneness. The 
absolute transcendence of being is maintained in an emanative hierarchical structure where every strata is
emanated from simple Being, hence from Unity (or One) can Unity (or One) come into being (see Nasr, S.H. An
Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines. (OUP: Oxford, 1964), p. 203 and Dinānī. Vol 1. p. 123) 
74Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Al-Sayyid Muḥammad Husayn. Bidāya al Ḥikmah. (Qum: Mu᾽assassa Maʿārif al-Islāmiyya, 
2010), p. 113 
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The quiddity of the effect is somewhat ‘dictated’ by the essential affinity between the cause 
and its effect and it follows that only an essentially multiple cause would emanate or cause an 
effect that is multiple qua multiple. Likewise an essentially United/Singular/One cause cannot 
produce an essentially disparate multiple effects. 
The Impossibility of Circularity and Regress in causes 
The impossibility of an infinite regress and vicious circle in causality. There are several 
principles at play that comprise the metaphysics of causation (law of quiddity, the law of the 
one, the law of necessity and the law of necessity between cause and effect) and the title of 
this chapter is another that compliments the discussion of causality. The definition of istihālah 
is literally impossibility and here it means in all four types of causes (formal, material, final and 
agent). Dawr implies dependence of something on itself and can be either explicit (muṣarriḥ) 
such as a depends on b and b depends on or it could be implicit (muḍmir) such as a depends 
on b which depends on c and this depends on a. The consequent of both is the precedence of 
thing to itself which is impossible. 
The discussion here is backgrounded by the Avicennan argument of wājib al wujūd bi dhātihī 
i.e. the sufficient cause is complete for the being of the thing, the mind conceptualises no 
cause outside of the thing conceived. On the other hand Ghazālī  renders the division of 
existence by Avicenna as redundant since the division by the theologians is primary (eternal 
and caused) and takes argument with the ‘b’ in ‘bi dhātihī  ’, he states, the ‘bi’ is ba al 
sababiyyah (the causative ba)) and there is cause implied here. In reply, the Avicennan would 
state agree that the bi here does not imply the dhāt causes the wājib al wujūd rather it is the 
reason75 why there is the necessary existent i.e. an internal cause within wājib al wujūd (the 
necessary existent) and this falls into the broader ontological schema espoused by Avicenna 
that in summation is the principle māhiyyahtuhū inniyatuhu (his cause is himself or literally 
‘his quiddity is his existence’). Ghazālī’s scathing attack on Avicenna’s analysis attempts to 
bankrupt his ontology on the basis that his key statement implies a separation i.e. an external 
75 Reason is ratio in Latin and the Arabs had a difficulty with defining reason here as it does not mean cause 
necessarily in the meaning Ghazzālī was attacking Avicenna. 
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cause. However this can be rebutted by saying the cause is not munfaṣil (disjointed) rather, it 
is mutaṣṣil (joined consecutively). Rāzī wades into the debate stating the Asharite position 
which distinguishes between the essence and existence of God (dhāt and wujūd). He says, 
dhāt Allah ῾illah li wujūdihi76 (the essence of God is a cause for his existence), the bifurcation 
of God into essence and existence here creates further problems of regress and circularity 
since the non‐existence of one engenders the nonexistence of another. 
The foremost commentator on Avicenna, Naṣīr al Dīn  Ṭūsī, corrects the aforementioned 
positions. The proof negating infinite regress or causes requires more argumentation than 
that which is required for circularity (a self‐evident fallacy). The proof offered by Avicenna is 
the most firm in this regard:77 a cause (b) causes an effect (a), the cause (a) has its own cause 
too called the ῾illah al ῾illah (c) – each of these three have their own unique or quintessential 
property 
 A is an effect and ONLY only an effect 
 B is a cause and a effect 
 C is only a cause and NOT a effect 
Now, if we added further components to the scheme such as c, d and e acting only as a cause 
we would have intermediaries increasing but ending with an ̔ illah al ῾illah (cause of causes) at 
the end such as e or c in the above example. Infinite regress implies there is no c or a, and we 
have the intermediaries in infinite succession. The proof of Avicenna would say that there has 
to be a ṭaraf (limit) to the intermediary chain. Infinite regress spoken of here means the 
simultaneous existence of an eternal amount of causes and effects, this is the point of 
contention for Avicenna not non‐simultaneous cause and effect. We cannot have a rābiṭ 
(connector)) without a marbūṭ bihi (that which is connected by the connector) i.e. the finitude 
of causes that lead to a first cause then we left with independent existents that are not 
connected to a first cause. 
76 Al Rāzī, Fakhr al Din Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar. Maṭālib al ‘āliyah min al ʿilm al ʾIlāhī. (Beirut: Dar Kutub al 
ʿilmiyya, 1999), vol.1 p. 55
77 Sina, Ibn. 
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Causal Determinacy and the Invalidity of Chance 
The rejection of chance is a primeval debate amongst philosophers and the Greek philosopher 
Democrates argued for eternal matter (not form) as did Aristotle78. This trend of thought 
informs Ghazālī’s riposte to the philosophers regarding the eternality of the cosmos79 
(something he regarded as antithetical to the theology of Islam which posits a single eternal 
agent/cause as God and all that is his creation is temporal). The subject matter of metaphysics 
is existence qua existent and in physics it is existence qua body. The discussion here is 
metaphysical but discussed by Aristotle in the physics books one and two. 
There must be an ontological link between the agent and the act. Thus finding treasure 
without intending may be defined as good luck or a wall falling on someone as bad luck. Luck 
and chance are not synonymous rather, luck is more specific and chance is more general, 
including natural events etc.  Ṭabāṭabāʾī rebuts the notion of atoms being scattered in space 
and coming together by chance as the natural philosophers hold. Ittifāq is synonymous with 
ṣidfah80 and can mean two things: negation of the agent cause (nafī al illah al fā’iliiyah) ‐ this 
is the denial of agency or negation of the final cause (nafī al illah al ghā᾽īyyah) – this is the 
denial of purpose albeit maintaining an agency. For the second type, Aristotle speaks of a man 
who visits the market to purchase fruit and happens to meet someone who owes him money 
thereby recuperating his dues. 
78 Most Greek philosophers are known as naturalists or materialists, holding the pre-existence or eternality of 
matter. See Belo, Catarina. Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes. (Brill: Oxford, 2007), p. 10-25 
79 Many Muslim philosophers have written treatises under the rubric of ḥudūth al ῾ālam (for example see Gilani, 
Mulla Shamsa. The Incipience of the Cosmos (Ḥudūth al alam). (London: Iranshahr. 2015) and Sadra, Mulla. 
Ḥudūth al alam. (Tehran: Institute of Philosophy, 2010); Taymiyya, Ibn. Mas’alat ḥudūth al ‘alam. (Beirut: dār 
Kutub al ʿilmiyya, 2005) 
80 From the Greek ta automaton. It has numerous meanings amongst them (al Haydari, Sharḥ Nihāya,. P. 244):
 Al ḥādithah laysa lahā illah fā’iliiyah – a temporal thing does not have an efficient cause 
 Inna fi’lan qad quṣida min fiā’lan ‘ala shay’in la yatawaqqa’a minhu – the act was intended by an
agent for a thing unexpected by the agent
 Inna al fā’il qad qāma bi ʿamalin min ʾajli hadaf khāṣ wa laqinnahu qad intahā ila natījatin lam 
yaqṣudhā - an act can be wrought for a specific purpose but terminates with a conclusion that was not
intended 
 Inna zāhiratan lam yataʿallaq bihā qaṣd aḥadin muṭlaqa – the phenomenon is unattached to the
intention (or will) of anyone absolutely, complete negation of agent and purpose. 
 Anna zāhiratan lam tūjad ʿan qaṣd il fāʿil al ṭabī’ī – a phenomenon devoid of the will of a natural agent 




                         
                               
                           
                               
                           
               
 
                         
                             
                         
                 
                     
                                 
                     
                   
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                     
 
                             
                               
                                                 
 
      





     
  
The Muslim philosophers deny chance outright and divide phenomena into four classes: those 
that occur invariably (dāʾim al wujūd81), some that occur on some occasions, some most of the 
times and others that are rare (e.g. certain congenital issues). The occurrence of phenomena 
at varying degrees is based on the absence or presence of conflicting factors such as birth 
disabilities are the result of factors that conflict and cause these things.82 Everything is 
invariable and conditioned only by other conflicting/causative factors. Ṭabāṭabāʾī states: 
“Those which occur most of the time differ from those which occur always 
due to the occasional existence of a conflicting factor, as in the case of the 
number of fingers on a hand, which is five (disregarding and deformity or 
disability83). However, occasionally, the fashioning principle of the fingers 
(in the foetus), comes upon surplus matter possessing the capacity the 
form of a finger and it shapes that into a finger. From this, it is known that 
the fingers, being five, is conditional upon the non‐existence of surplus 
matter and this phenomenon with this condition occurs invariably, not 
most of the time. That which occurs rarely will also occur invariably and 
always on condition of the conflicting factor being present. Hence, if the 
phenomena that occur mostly or rarely in fact occur invariably on the 
presence of requisite conditions. The case of phenomena that occur half of 
the time is quite obvious. Hence, all phenomena involve causal invariability, 
following a continuous, fixed system that neither changes nor is violated”84 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī  continues to state that what is perceive an omen of luck or misfortune is actually 
a failure on the observers part to differentiate the fact that digging for water and finding 
81 The word dāʿim here refers to the logical meaning i.e. invariably x will occur if the subject exists (from the 
propositions that are bound by variables) 
82 Ṭabāṭabāʾī says everything is natural and it is how it is supposed to be based on the fact that everything has a 
cause, defects, natural disasters etc. are caused by something known or unknown. Thus, the issue of miracles 
refers to the shrinking of natural causes, variables to a very short time interval and not protracted as we may see 
i.e. the staff turning to a snake is completely natural but quickened by the will of Allah. A philosophical 
principle states al wuqūʿ tadullu ʿala al imkān – occurrence indicates possibility (Ṭabāṭabā᾽ī. p. 120 and Dinānī. 
Vol. 2 p. 125)
83 This would still not be chance or bad luck as Ṭabāṭabāʾī will explain.
84 Ṭabāṭabā᾽ī. p. 78 (Trans. Qarai) 
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treasure or a roof collapsing on one seeking shelter are ‘invariable and essential ends of their 
causes, which are only accidentally ascribed to something else’. The digging is an essential 
action whose end would be to invariable, find treasure, though the ascription to the individual 
digging for water is merely accidental. Similar is the case of a ‘bad luck’ situation when a roof 
collapses on one seeking shelter. Essentially the roof possesses all the prerequisites to collapse 
such as a compromised structure owing to weather damage or defective construction. The 
essential end or even ‘final perfection’ of the roof is to give way and actualise its lack of 
integrity and it is a mere accident to think the roof was there to provide shelter from the 
elements. 
Ṭabāṭabā᾽ī concludes a lengthy section by stating chance and the like are beliefs resulting from 
an ignorance of causality. This reiterates the view as per  Ṭabāṭabā᾽ī  that causality proffers 
regularity, continuity and allows for logical process. It also affirms that everything has a telos, 






       
 
 
       
 
                               
                                 
                             
                               
                       
                                    
 
                         
                             
                         
                               
                       
                              
                       
                                                 
    
 
   
   
      
     
 
     
 
    




Miracles and the Qurʾān 
Miracles: Concept and Definition 
The Arabic word for miracle or the miraculous is muʿjiza or iʿjāz which denotes “that which 
renders one incapable or impotent”.85 This term does not appear in the Qurʾān as is the case 
with other theological idioms rather, the Qurʾān employs the word ayah (sign)86 and this is 
used in a threefold sense87: with reference to the verses or dictum of the Quran that 
challenges Muḥammad’s interlocutors to present anything of its similitude in rhetoric and 
style,88 the miracle of itself and the signs of soul and cosmos that allude to a higher authority.89 
The mere conceptualisation of the term miracle heralds a foray into epistemic lacunae 
regarding its reality. Probing the arcana and mythical is deemed a matter of belief and 
devotion that should be considered beyond the realm of rational discourse. The celebrated 
reviver of Aristotelianism in the Islamic world, Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 ) (or Averroës in Latin), 
despite articulating a robust rejoinder to the arguments of Ghazālī  in Tahāfut regarding 
substance ontology and peripatetic thought, he failed to win the argument as far as miracles 
and the extraordinary in relation to the necessary causal‐nexus90. Averroës considered the 
85 Jurjānī, Al Sayyid Al Sharif. Kitāb al taʿrīfāt. (Under muʿjiza). (Beirut: Dar al Kutub. 2000) 
86 Isfahānī, Rāghib al. Al Mufradāt Gharīb al Qur’an. (Beirut: Dar al Kutub, 1999) 
87 Gril, Denis. The Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān (ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe). (Brill: Leiden, 2003), p. 392
(under Miracles) 
88 The Quran in a self-referential manner presents a challenge to the disbelievers to bring verses of its like. The 
exegetes and theologians have provided varying reasons for the incapability of the Arabs of the time to rise to
this challenge amongst the arguments being divergence (al ṣarf) where God rendered the opponents unable to
carry out this task by his extraordinary ability to affect minds or diverted their attentions and dissuade them from
this challenge. However this view has been thoroughly refuted as nonsensical by the likes of Ṭabāṭabāʾī on the 
basis of the inherent qualities found within the Qur’ān and its emphasis on in inability of human production by
the fact that it is from the knowledge of the omniscient creator. The book thus has an inherent miraculous quality 
not that men can contrive to debunk it but are prevented so by God. . (See Al Mizān vol. 1 p. 75 and Maʿrifa, 
Hādī. Al Tamhīd fi ʿulūm Qur’ān al Karīm. (Qum: Mu᾽assassa al tamhīd. 2007), vol 4, p. 10) 
89 Gril, Denis. p. 392 (under Miracles)
90 Fakhry. Islamic Occasionalism. p.21 and Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut al Tahāfut
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matter of miracles a precept of the religion or Sharī῾ah that should be believed outright and 
delving into their probity would render one liable to punishment.91 
A miracle proves the veracity of a claim to prophethood,92 this is a recurrent theme Muslim 
theological discourse.93 However Fakhry makes the argument that the basic assumption of a 
miracle validating the claim of prophethood can be questioned as to why this assumption is 
so, does a prophet necessarily need to produce a miracle to vindicate his prophethood? 
Furthermore, he remarks that if a miracle proves the claim of prophethood and if likewise 
prophethood validates the miracle, a circular argument becomes apparent. 
The philosophers have approached the problem in several ways, some have argued miracle 
stories found in the canon are merely allegories, symbols for higher truths rather than real 
occurrences whereas the Avicenna and his commentators have adhered to a trifold explication 
of theoretical, imaginative and intellectual purport. The latter predicates ideas of prophecy 
and the incumbent acts of prophets on their psychic powers that lend way to prognostication. 
The theory of prophecy is also based on this psychological rationale94. The Aristotelian 
character and Neoplatonist doctrine of forms and emanation is salient in the Avicennan 
purview of the miraculous 
Sacred History: A Qurʾānic perspective 
The stories around the text what theologians term “sacred history” is not necessarily history 
as defined by the science we know as history with its concomitant structures, methods and 
epistemic framework. The narrative proffered by the Qurʾān from the perspective of a Muslim 
is an unquestionable truth claim that it is the direct word of God. In this light, Qurʾānic history 
is meta‐history, in the sense that the revealed scripture conveys the consecutive, 
91 Ibn Rushd. Tahāfut al Tahāfut. p. 322 
92 Ḥillī. Sharḥ Tajrīd. p. 66
93 See Ḥillī, Allāma. Kashf al Murad fi Sharḥ Tajrīd al I’tiqād. (Beirut: dar al ‘Amira, 2006), p. 157 and ‘Ījī, 
Aḍud al Din ‘Abd al Rahman ibn Ahmad.  Mawāqif fi ilm al kalām. (Beirut: dar al Jabal. 1997), p. 342 and
Saflo, Mohammad Moslem Adel. Al-Juwaynī’s thought and methodology: with a translation and commentary on
Lumaʿ al-Adilla. (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag. 2000), p. 259 
94 Marmura, Michael E. "Avicenna's Psychological Proof of Prophecy." Journal of Near Eastern Studies 22. no. 1
(Jan, 1963) 49-56 
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uninterrupted and uniquely unadulterated hand in the cosmic system. It is in this background 
that Ghazālī  in the fayṣal allows for the literal acceptance of Qurʾānic events rather than 
resorting to taʾwīl. Thereby, he upholds Asharite occasionalism over predetermined causality 
where according to his framework the rational possibility of miracles is negated.95 The 
speculative dilemma of the miraculous has its antecedents in antiquity prior to the advent of 
Islam in the Judaeo‐Christian milieu and ancient civilisations such as the Greek, Egyptian and 
Mesopotamian. Thus, a thorough understanding of the phenomenon requires an appreciation 
of the speculative ambience that generated, nurtured and sustained the debate in Muslim 
philosophical and theological circles. 
The Prophet and Miracles 
Ascriptions of miracles to Muḥammad are scant or absent in comparison verses detailing the 
miraculous happenings at the hands of previous prophets. The prophet is found imploring his 
Lord to puncture mundane happenings with extraordinary signs at the behest of his sent 
envoy in a bid to convince the unrelenting antagonists. These requests are ultimately denied 
of him and the Qurʾān reiterates that such miraculous occurrences will not vindicate his claim 
since the hardened disbelievers he is up against will naught any such occurrence by way of 
sorcery and magic96. The Quran says: “If you could wish for a passage opening into the ground, 
or a ladder up to the sky in order to give them a sign! If God had wanted to he would have 
gathered them all on guidance. Therefore do not be among those who are ignorant”.97 
Christian polemicists cast anathema upon the ‘prophet of the Saracens’ as a sensuous, war‐
mongering charlatan who performed no miracles nor related past/future events through 
revelation, the comparison between Jesus and Muḥammad was readily presented in this 
95 Whittingham, Martin. Al-Ghazālī and the Qur’an: One book, many meanings. (Routledge: Oxford, 2007), p.
23.  
96 See the Qur’an (34:43-45) (And those who disbelieve say of the truth when it has come to them, ‘This is not
but obvious magic.’) and Qur’an (26:221-223) where the prophet condemns sorcery as an insinuation of the devil
(And those who disbelieve say of the truth when it has come to them, ‘This is not but obvious magic.’) my
translation 
97 Quran. (6:36) 
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regard.98 It is clear from the earlier passage that Muḥammad himself declared he was unable 
to work miracles of the nature demanded by the idolaters in his midst. However, the most 
penetrating and celebrated miracle of the prophet is that of the Qurʾān. The Qurʾān despite 
denying miracles of an order, affirms the miraculous nature of the Qurʾān and sets it out as a 
challenge that will dumbfound and render opponents incapable. The question thus arises, how 
do we define the Qurʾān as miraculous? It is not as tactile and sentient as a staff morphing 
instantly into a spitting serpent, a blind man being cured or the parting of a large body of 
water. The concept of iʿjāz al qurʾān (inimitability of the Qurʾān) is the most fundamental 
subject in the arena of Qurʾānic studies as it aims to prove the inimitability, immutability and 
divine origin of the Qurʾān. 
Miracles: A Metaphysical or Historical analysis? 
A key question one may ask here is what reality a miracle actually has in so far as historical or 
empirical proof. This is a very valid question that has been raised in modern philosophical 
discourse, especially in the empirically oriented strands and in light of modern science the 
whole dilemma of the extraordinary or miraculous is cast aside as superstitious and mere 
belief devoid of robust evidence. Historically speaking, miracles are the least probable 
evidence since a historian is incapable of empirically performing scientific experiments that 
yield strong probabilities of how the natural world functions. Theologically, the assertion of 
miracles and the activity of god in the ancient world is viable but historically one cannot insert 
theology or metaphysics into their investigation99. History is not necessarily a retelling of the 
past as it actually occurred rather it is a accumulation of patterns of life from sources that are 
independent, multiple and preferable contemporaneous. 
Despite the validity of the argument and the need to provide proofs, our speculation is of a 
different order as Fakhry as pointed out in his introduction.100 Substantiating the historicity of 
98 Tolan, John. European accounts of Muḥammad’s life. (In The Cambridge companion to Muḥammad. ed. 
Jonathon E. Brockopp). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 234
99 Ehrman, Bart. D. How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee. (NY: Harper One, 
2014). The author discusses history and the miracles of Jesus according to the historical method.
100 Fakhry. p. 12 
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a miracle requires its own methodology, epistemic structures and questions of an order 
unrelated to the field of metaphysics. Notwithstanding the above, it would be foolhardy to 
insert or even assert the miraculous and extraordinary into the cosmic order by metaphysical 
means only. The question of miracle and its verifiability (if at all possible) is inevitably 
multifaceted since its reliability on probative historical evidence strays little from anecdote 
(especially in light of modern scepticism and scientism) and metaphysical analysis has 
propriety subsequent to a historical appraisal of the phenomenon. 
The study of miracles can be somewhat a bewildering excursion into the mythological and 
arcane. Nonetheless, religious people all venerate miracles of some sort or the other that are 
found in their scripture and oral or written history. Thus, there are several problems when 
studying miracles, the first is how acceptable critical or sceptical forays into a sacrosanct and 
cherished belief are welcomed within the believing community101? Secondly, to what extent 
the intelligentsia, philosophers and the like have disseminated the study beyond the experts 
of those respective fields. Thirdly, the issue of prophetology is inextricably linked with miracles 
in the Qurʾān where many verses echo the words of prophets who endeavoured to vindicate 
their divine appointment by way of miracles demanded by their interlocutors.102 
101 Ibn Rushd as stated earlier said to discuss or cast doubt on the issue of miracles is to slander the Shari’ah and 
disintegrate belief. He uses this argument to somewhat sidestep the whole issue without delving into a robust
defence in his Tahāfut al Tahāfut as he did with all the other contentions raised by Ghazālī in his original
polemic. Avicenna also falls in the line of criticism, Averroës laments the open Avicennan perception of
miracles, an issue which he should have remained silent on. See Tahāfut al Tahāfut. p. 320 (English translation)
102 The prophet Ṣāliḥ is asked to provide a sign proving his mission in (26:104 – ‘you are aught but a man like 
us, bring a sign if you are of the truthful ones’)) a recurring motif in Qurʾānic discourse. In other places the 
prophet has already mentioned his ability to bring about miraculous events along with the announcement of his 
prophethood such as the case of Moses in (7:105-7 – ‘I have come with clear evidence from your lord, so
dispatch the children of Israel with me. They said, if you have come with a sign, then bring it forth if you are of
the truthful ones’). In the case of Jesus, the Quran quotes him in (3:49 – ‘and a messenger to the Children of






           
 
                         
                           
                               
                   
 
                   
 
                   
                       
                         
                            
 
                                                 
 
   
      
 
    
    
    







    
    
  
   
  
   
Chapter Three 
Miracles and the law of Causation 
The metaphysics of causation as contextualised in the Bidāya of Ṭabāṭabā᾽ī and the nature of 
miracles especially in the Quranic context have been analysed thus far. We can logically 
proceed to the crux of the argument after discussing both concepts to a reasonable degree of 
clarity, the critique and counter argument can be delved into. 
Ghazālī103, the Seventeenth discussion of Tahāfut al falāsifa: Islamic Occasionalism 
Ghazālī  perhaps, represents the most influential and scathing criticism against important 
aspects of Islamic philosophical thought in the early period. Some have erroneously 
understood Ghazālian critiques to herald the decline of Islamic civilisation on account have 
the fatal blows he dealt the rational disciplines shifting discourse to an insular religiosity.104 
103 He is Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Aṭ-Ṭūsī Al-Ghazālī (d.1111), regarded as one of the greatest 
Muslim theologians, jurists and theoreticians. He produced many works (400 according to popular opinion)  
ranging from logic such as miʿyār al ʿilm, a magnum opus on devotion, ethics and spirituality called  Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm 
ad-dīn, a personal autobiography retelling his tumultuous engagement with the truth called al-Munqidh min aḍ-
ḍalāl, on philosophy he wrote works that influenced western thinkers such as Maqāṣid al-falāsifah, the powerful
and influential critique under discussion here, the Tahāfut  and other works in jurisprudence and theology such
as the al-Mustaṣfā and al-Iqtiṣād fī al-lʿtiqād. See Frank. R. Al;-Ghazālī and the Asharite School. (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1994); Naseemrafiaabadi, H. Emerging from darkness: Ghazālī’s impact on western
philosophers. (Delhi: Sarup and sons, 2002); Al-Ghazālī. Al-Munqidh min aḍ-ḍalāl. (Washington: The council 
for research in values and philosophy, 2001) 
104 This misrepresentation was much celebrated by orientalists and academics working under their paradigm.
Modern scholars in the academy and already so in traditional circles are more reasoned in analysing the so called 
decline of Islamic scientific and intellectual thought, basing their theories on multiple agents that contributed to
the slowed progress, if it actually occurred. Islamic civilisation flourished for many hundreds of years post-
Ghazālī, especially so in rational disciplines. The flowering of philosophy and theoretical mysticism in Persian 
lands especially Iran to this day is a noteworthy testament to this. For the orientalist narrative of decline see 
Gillespie, Michael Allen. The theological Origins of Modernity. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p.
292; Nicholson, R. A Literary History of the Arabs, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), 442-3 and 
for the alternative readings see; Robert Wisnovsky, “The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary 
in Post-Classical (CA. 1100-1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Some Preliminary Observations” 
in Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries, edited by P. Adamson, H.
Balthussen, and M. W. F. Stone, II, 149-191;  Khaled Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth
Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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The issue of causation in the Tahāfut is very much a continuum of a general trend of Asharite 
theological tenet upheld by Ghazālī’s predecessors such as his teacher Al‐Juwaynī (d.478 AH), 
al‐Bāqillānī  (d.403 AH), Ibn Fourek (d.406 AH), Isfarayīnī  (d. 437 AH), and the eponymous 
founder of the school, Imam al‐Ashʿarī (d.324 AH). It was the aforementioned luminaries of 
Asharite thought and the master himself who posited the absolute omnipotence of God as the 
ultimate desideratum of their theology dialectic and the imperative reality ordained by the 
cannon of Islam. Imam al‐Ashʿarī in al‐Ibānah ‘an uṣūl al‐diyānah outlines in edict‐like fashion, 
the fundamentals of his creed105. Others such as the later Asharite, al‐Sanūsī  (d.895 AH) 
following in the same vein reiterated popular Asharite doctrine in much the same edict like 
dictum as the schools namesake scribed in his declaration of Asharite orthodoxy106. 
Ghazālī  has probably gained notoriety and influence as his critique is probably the most 
scathing, reasoned and directly addressed to the falāsifa. Furthermore, shortcomings in 
certain parts of the Averroean critique, Tahāfut al‐Tahāfut, bolstered the Ghazālian hegemony 
in the Islamic east in contrast to the influence of Averroës in the Latin West. Especially on the 
problem of miracles, Averroës relegated metaphysical analysis to a mute spectator with no 
authority to unravel its rational underpinnings, it was merely a matter of devotion and belief 
obliged by the divine lawgiver107. 
Ghazālī  divides opinion on causation in the seventeenth section of the incoherence, one 
displaying conformity with philosophical notions and another which departs from their 
assumptions. He draws upon the issue of rationally explicating miracles especially in light of 
Qurʾānic verses that contrast with ideas of causation on first impression. Two pertinent 
examples invoked in this critique is that of the prophet Ibrahīm being cast into the fire of 
Nimrūd and remaining unscathed by the inferno and the classic example of the casual nexus 
between the combustion of cotton on contact with fire. In both causation is merely a relation 
which has no mutual necessity and it is the working of custom or habit of God (ʿādat Allah).108 
105 Fakhry. Islamic Occasionalism. p. 57 and al-Ash‘arī, ‘Alī ibn Ismā‘īl. Al-Ibānah ‘an uṣūl al-diyānah. (Al-
Riyāḍ: Dār al-Faḍīlah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī‘, 2011). p. 5
106 Foudah, Saʿīd and Abdul ʿAzīz, Suraqah. A Refined Explanation of the Sanūsī Creed the Foundational Proofs. 
(London: Sunni publications, 2013)
107 Fakhry. p. 10/25/ 40/ 60-75 
108 Tahāfut. p. 245 
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He accepts secondary causes which are sustained by god in an ever renewing or re‐creating 
(khalq jadīd) fashion through him as a primary cause. God is the primary cause of the whole 
system of potencies, contingencies and powers.109 In wresting the God from the heretic 
falāsifa Ghazālī  sterilises the divinity of all fecundity, vitality and dynamic by isolating 
everything into an unrelated, nature‐less and illogical ontological realm.110 Thus for Ghazālī, 
there are no necessary relationships between things like based on cause and effect, no 
inherent natures in things that defines their capacity, ability and perfection, causality is merely 
observed but needn’t occur always as that (although the question of improbable regularity 
was used as a critique of Humean causation) and God is free from all determinations (although 
Ghazālī  concedes logical impossibilities cannot occur) that restrict him such as the 
aforementioned doctrines held by the falāsifa111 . 
Averroes on miracles in Tahāfut al Tahāfut 
The causation debate typifies a dialogue of thought preoccupying minds in both the Islamicate 
tradition and upon its reception, western intellectual circles such as Aquinas and Hume. 
Ghazālī’s proto‐Humean ideas were critiqued by Averroes112 (d. 1198 CE) in a substantial 
analysis of the controversy, Averroes, a puritan Aristotelean, regurgitates Ghazālī’s arguments 
and critiques them in a sustained and penetrating analysis. The rehabilitation of causation, 
defence of substance ontology and explication of the philosophers’ premises is robust. 
However, as both Kogan113 and Fakhry114 have both remarked, there is no theoretical 
framework for the miraculous rather, the miracle is relegated to mere belief and according to 
the reading of Kogan, magic or sorcery.115 
109 Griffel. p. 156 
110 Fakhry, p. 110 
111 Tahāfut. 220, Kogan, p. 126 and Fakhry. p. 200
112 He is Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd, Averroës, Latin Averrhoës, also known 
as Ibn Rushd (1126-1198 CE).Averroës was a distinguished philosopher, jurist, judge and physician during the
Almoravid dynasty in Andalusia. His work include extensive commentaries on the works of Aristotle and  Plato’s 
Republic which accessed by the Jewish, Christian and Latin world in the centuries after his death
113 Kogan. p. 79
114 Fakhry. p. 12 
115 Kogan. p. 79
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Averroës dissociates himself from naturalistic theories of miracles, antagonising the 
Avicennan view that the power of the soul is capable of producing miraculous 
events.116Averroës wrestled with the idea of emanation that comprises the Neoplatonist 
superstructure of Avicennan thought, accepting it in earlier works and rejecting it in latter 
works.117 He also castigates his predecessors such as Fārābī  and especially Avicenna for 
misappropriating Aristotelian thought, heavily Platonising it with theories of forms and 
emanation, methodological and linguistic faults and predicating revealed religion on pre 
ratiocination118 
He considers miracles the sole prerogative of prophets who have been graced and blessed 
with such a power that lies beyond the reach of other humans. Virtue and rectitude is borne 
out conviction is such events which herald a manifesto of virtue for the common man. Thus, 
they lie beyond the reach of even trained minds, even if their basis is known it should not be 
divulged to the masses. Averroës gives the impression that any explication of miracles or 
doubt created therein will undermine the law and thereby compromise virtuosity. Thus, he is 
led to the belief in the unquestionable nature of miracles as implied in the revelation. The 
concern is acutely practical rather than theoretical which could possibly stem from the 
pragmatic exigencies Averroës was faced with being the Chief Judge of Cordoba. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī on miracles and causation in Al Mīzān fi Tafsīr al Qurʾān 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s explication of miracles is generally grounded in the Avicennan psychological 
analysis where he states the causal nexus that defines the rational discussion is, prima facie, 
116 Atiyeh, George. Avicenna’s conception of miracles. (PhD thesis submitted to University of Chicago, 1954), p 
40. Also See Rahman, Fazlur.  Avicenna’s Psychology (Oxford, 1952, Repr. Westport, Conn., 1981), p 67, 
Rahman, Fazlur. Prophecy in Islam-Philosophy and Orthodoxy. (Chicago. Repr. 2007) and Ibn Sina. Al Shifā: 
Ilāhiyyāt. (Beirut. Dar al fikr, 2008) Book 9 Ch. 4 
117 Kogan. p
118 Bertolacci, Amos. Averroës against Avicenna on Human Spontaneous Generation: The Starting-Point of a 
Lasting Debate. (In Akasoy, Anna and Giglioni, Guido. Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic 
Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. (NY: Springer, 2012), Ch. 2 p. 37. Bertolacci discusses a particular 
doctrine that Averroës criticised but also locates this critique in the broader framework of Averroës overarching
defiant strand to Avicennan metaphysical speculation although he is somewhat affable to his medical works.
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absent when confronted by a miraculous occurrence that is heterogeneous to the logically 
observed natural order119. There is no recourse for the credulous or the sceptic to the crux of 
the matter since the recurring causal connections customarily observed are hidden and one 
remains ignorant of them despite acknowledging summarily that the extraordinary psychic 
powers of prophets allow them to impress upon the natural order in a way that departs from 
the norm. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī directs attention to the problem of miracles in the exegesis of (2:22) where the 
Qurʾān puts forth a challenge to bring a verse of its similitude if the deniers are capable of 
such. The challenge is twofold, the reality of extraordinary, miraculous events and that the 
Qurʾān as an extension and instance of a miracle. Proof of the former would vindicate the 
latter. The Qurʾānic position is definitive on the principle of miracle with numerous verses 
being challenges to disprove its veracity, but, it also establishes a framework that can explicate 
acts indifferent to the natural causal nexus. In fact, the Qurʾān abides by the law of causality 
to prove its veracity by stating it independently puts forth the challenge rather than prove the 
prophethood of Muḥammad directly. The causal nexus here rests on the fact that if the 
miraculous nature of the Qurʾān is proved then by logical consequence prophethood of 
Muḥammad is proven. Prior to both the former is proving the very nature of khāriq al ādah 
(literally break in habit) and (if possible) what sort of theoretical framework this would be 
rationally possible. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī highlights the traditional arguments for the miraculous nature of the Qurʾān (Iʿjāz 
al Qurʾān) such as its stylistic perfections, the inconceivability of an untaught man producing 
such a text of his own accord, the consistency of claims despite the evolving environment of 
its reception and recipient, the unseen and future events foretold in it, the absence of 
inconsistencies, and the intellectual dimensions that cannot be replicated.120 The 
aforementioned aspects viewed in their entirety invalidates habitual, natural and material 
causes for the compilation of such a text. The causal nexus seems to be disrupted and one is 
compelled to seek an alternative provenance in divine authorship.121 The arguments 
119 Al Mizān. Vol 14. p 304 (under the verse 20:79) 
120 Al Mizān. Vol 1. p 64 
121 Al Mizān. Vol 1. p 75 
36 
 
                             
                                 
                             
                           
                       
                       
                             
                       
 
                     
                       
                                 
                         
                         
                                 
                             
                               
                         
                               
 
 
                       
                           
                                  
                         
                             
                     
 
                             
                                     
                                                 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī begins with assume the occurrence of a miracle and he is only vindicating the fact 
the Qurʾān is a miracle on the basis of the extraordinary aspects it has. The determining factor 
for our enquiry is how he harmonises the principle of causality with heterogeneous acts like 
miracles in a philosophical‐exegetical analysis. He does embark on this analysis by arguing the 
Qurʾān assents to the general principle of causality, establishes the propriety of 
heterogeneous phenomena, reiterates Allah as the real and independent cause for everything 
and establishes the efficacy of prophetic souls in rendering acts contrary to the habitual course 
of nature save it is by the will and command of Allah122. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī  initially answers some criticisms regarding the linguistic miracle of the Qurʾān 
which revolve around language being a manmade phenomenon and thereby no linguistic 
creation can be beyond the reach of men and the issue of only one stylistic composition can 
be preeminent not one idea expressed in several ways all enjoying miraculous parity. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī counters by posing a question that granted, language is a human construct but 
does that imply the nonexistence of a literature that is unattainable by the very makers of that 
language? Otherwise the inventors must be the most superior in utilising their inventions as a 
sword‐maker must be the best swordsman or the inventor of chess must be the best chess 
player. In reply to the latter critique, Ṭabāṭabāʾī states that a stylistic, rhetorical and eloquent 
miracle is based on a meaning that encompasses and exhausts all aspects that are mental and 
extra‐mental.123 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī  initially outlines his view on causation, one that conforms to the philosophical 
tradition he hails from. He mentions the general principle of causation (qanūn al ʿilliya al ʿ āma) 
as being established by the Qurʾān, man by nature is predisposed to seek a cause for every 
material thing without hesitation or doubt and provided at requisite conditions are present 
there is a necessary relationship between cause and effect. This is axiomatic and granted in 
Qurʾānic discourse when natural events, life, death and sickness is mentioned. 
The natural order is also punctuated by heterogeneous events ascribed to the prophets in the 





                     
                             
                             
                                     
                                 
                           
                         
                   
                            
                               
                     
 
                             
                       
                         
                             
                             
                       
                         
      
 
                             
                 
                             
                         
                             
                         
                       
                   
                                                 
  
  
the speaking of animals. These, Ṭabāṭabāʾī acknowledges as khāriq al ʿāda although with the 
caveat that they are not rational impossibilities in essence such as the affirmation and 
negation of two opposite propositions together from all aspects124 or a thing can be negated 
from itself or one is not half of two and so on and so forth. These are essential impossibilities 
which all rational peoples in all epochs have assented to and if miracles where of the same 
impossibilities then then their rejection would have been equally obvious to the sane and 
reasonable but the history bears witness that all religious peoples have accepted miraculous 
events.125 However,  Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s argument that religious people have accepted miracles on 
the basis they are not impossible like the aforementioned axioms assumes religious belief and 
miracles must be rational because a large number of people have accepted them and they are 
on par with axioms like the one is half of two. 
Miracles are effects of causes that are not observed or experienced physically (al asbāb al 
mādiyya al mashhūda) rather, the causes are fewer, inconspicuous and expedited. For 
example, a decomposed body enriches the earth, becomes organic matter and through a 
gradual and causative scheme become a living creature again and similarly a wooden staff can 
undergo the same natural transformative stages that at some point may well be the genotype 
and phenotype of a hissing snake. Ṭabāṭabāʾī argues all such natural phenomena are dictated 
by specific temporal, spatial and causative factors that are sequential and affirmed by 
experimentation and observation. 
The miracle, invariably elicited by the will of a prophet, shatters the time barrier and 
invalidates material causes.  Ṭabāṭabāʾī, further argues that unexplainable super natural 
events are always occurring even in the atomic age. However the assumption of them being 
supernatural is inherent in Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s thought process, whereas a sceptic could say they are 
not really supernatural but, events that need analysis and science can explicate them now or 
in the future supernatural occurrences in history were deemed so because of primitive 
scientific understanding and science today is more refined and accurate in ascertaining 
material causes. However,  Ṭabāṭabāʾī  answers the sceptic arguing that science may well 




                           
                           
 
 
                     
                         
                               
                           
                       
 
                           
                               
                                  
                           
                     
                                
                       
                                 
              
 
                                 
                             
                                 
                                   
                                 
                         
                                                 






    
discover electromagnetic energy fields that a human can access and manipulate. Such a theory 
could supersede other theories, reducing causation to a single cause of magnetic (or quantum) 
fields.126 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī interprets verses alluding to the all‐pervasive command of God, the omnipresent 
answerer of prayers and his exhaustive dominance over everything as God disclosing himself 
as the bestowing, causing, willing agent that knows no bounds to what he permits in the 
natural order.127 In a nutshell the verses affirm every occurrence natural or supernatural is 
connected to his will and command albeit conventional pathways may appear disconnected. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī states 65:3 (indeed Allah has decreed a measure for everything) clarifies that it is 
God who acts within the causal nexus and the causative factors all adhere to the ‘measure’ 
decreed by God.128 There is an existential link that God is privy to and humans are invariably 
ignorant. The causative efficacy is rendered so by the ‘measure’ God apportions, wills and 
bestows.  Ṭabāṭabāʾī  and the Qurʾān are unequivocal on the matter of causation being 
dependent on the prime factor i.e. God. The Asharite emphasis on the sovereignty of God and 
all possibility being possible with him resonates in this discourse when Ṭabāṭabāʾī says “cause 
and effect is in the hand of God and he engages with it however he pleases’ (bal ithbāt ʾannhā 
bi yad Allāh subhānahu yahawwiluhā kayfa shāʾa wa ʾarāda).129 
Notwithstanding the above, he does admit to the system of cause and effect and that there is 
a substantive, real relationship of a cause to its effect which cannot be thoroughly explicable 
without including the knowledge of God in it. The issue of ‘decree’ and ‘measure’ such as in 
the 15:21 (and there is not a thing save we possess the treasures (hidden knowledge) of it and 
we do not reveal it save in a decreed measure130) is a crucial in  Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s exegesis as it 
alludes to everything possessing a defined, apportioned, decreed nature that descends or is 
126 ibid. This is beyond the scope of this work and the author although a very interesting field of enquiry that
straddles physics, philosophy and theology.
127 He quotes 65:2-3 ( and whoever fears Allah He will render a deliverance for him and provide him sustenance 
from where he perceives not), 39:36 (I am very close and answer the call of the petitioner when he calls out ton 
me) and 12:21 (and Allah holds sway over his command (affair/creation), but most men do not know) 
128 Al Mizān. vol 1. p. 79 
129 ibid 
130 wa in min shayʾin illā khazāʾinuhu ʿindana wa ma nunazziluhu illā bi qadar il maʿlūm 
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revealed from an the realm of absoluteness to a stage of entification (taʿayyun)131 and 
individuation (tashakhkhuṣ). The decree and measure precedes and accompanies the thing 
thereby making its definition possible in relation to other things which have their own 
respective identities. An interconnected system of relations between things reveals each of 
their identities and natures such that other things serve as moulds to restrict, delimit and 
define other things. In such a schema a nexus is established which  Ṭabāṭabāʾī  interprets as 
cause and effect. We can see the Aristotelian and Avicennan influence here as the argument 
of defined natures has been deduced by Ṭabāṭabāʾī albeit by way of a philosophical exegesis 
of scripture. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī proceeds to interpret other verses132 as affirmations of the law of causality, a 
homogenous nexus (Sunnah Allah or ṣirāṭ mustaqīm), a cause always precedes an effect be it 
material or non‐material, that there is a single schema and pattern without deviation or chaos 
(watīrah wāḥidah wa nasq muntaẓim), real causes always produce their concomitant effects 
such as influenza results from strains of the influenzae virus not the cold weather and 
miraculous events follow the aforementioned trend albeit the cause is not immediately 
discernible. The author quotes several verses relating to the nature of God as the ultimate 
source of everything, the sustainer, the self‐sufficient being upon whom all things are 
dependent for their subsistence. Thus, all effects are in reality his effects and all causes are 
mere intermediaries acting as causes by his leave and command.133 He in effect proffers a 
permission of usufruct entirely contingent upon his will to bestow or withhold.  Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
131 Al Mizān. vol 1. p. 80. The terminology employed here is typically Sadrian who in turn benefitted from the 
Akbārian mystical concepts of waḥdat al wujūd alongside the Ishrāqī and peripatetic strands and demonstrates 
how philosophy is a synthetic process that absorbed various ideas over the centuries prior to reaching Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
who, represents a maturation of mystical‐philosophical speculation in Persian lands. For further reference see 
Nasr, S.H. Islamic philosophy from its origin to the present: philosophy in the land of prophecy. (NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2006) and for a thorough analysis of the mystical‐philosophical worldview in the 
teachings of ibn ʿArabī, Chittick, W. The Sufi path of Knowledge. (NY: The State University of New York Press, 
1989)
132 40:62 (zālikum Allāh rabbukum Khāliq kull shayʾ) and 11:56 (ma min dābah illā ʾākhizun bi nāṣiyatihā inna
rabbi ʿala ṣirāṭ mustaqīm). Al Mizān. vol 1. p. 80 
133 Ibid. Ṭabāṭabāʾī entitles this section as “al qurʾān yusnidu mā usnida ila al ʿilla  al mādiyyah ila Allāh..” (The 
Qurʾān attributes that which is attributed to material causes to Allah). The concept of attribution can be 
twofold; a metaphorically attribution in the realm of rhetoric and language or philosophical/rational attribution 
(isnād) that is not derived from usage as in language but reality such as attributing whiteness to a body, the 
whiteness is not really in the body rather the attribution is metaphorical with the body being indifferent to the 
white. Such is the relation of God to the world of cause and effect (lā muʾaththir fi al wujūd illa Allāh).
40 
 
                       
                           
                                 
                             
                               
                  
 
                 
                           
                         
                         
                             
                                 
                               
                           
                             
                                 
                                 
                         
                               
                         
                           
                                                 
                         
                               
                               
                               
                               
                             
                                  
                                  
               
     
 
  
makes an interesting observation here that the Qurʾānic concept of intercession (shafāʿah) 
and intermediaries is radically derived from the divine permission (idhn) granted to causes in 
so far as they can be efficacious agents in the created order.134 Every cause is ‘permitted’ to 
create its effect by the creative command135 cum permission of god which is prior and 
concomitant to it (the ‘permission’ or ‘creative command’ is none other than an aspect of God 
which paves the way for the cause to act).136 
Subsequent to the discussion on causation vis a vis God, Ṭabāṭabāʾī  introduces the role of 
prophets in effecting the casual order with heterogeneous acts. He states ‘al qurʾān yuthbit 
taʾthīran fī nufūs al anbiyāʾ fī al khwāriq’ (the Qurʾān establishes efficacy of prophetic souls in 
producing supernatural acts).137 The role of God’s permission is important here too as 
prophets cannot elicit such prowess independently to the extent it is argued that similar to 
miracle, magic has a psychological basis that is borne out of the divine permit. The will power 
or psychological aptitude of the prophet (or other agent such as a sorcerer or believer who 
has acquired this acumen through diligent discipline) is the driving factor for miracles, it 
overpowers and supersedes other causes. Albeit the caveat is that the causative factor is the 
special power bestowed upon them by god which is a cause for the miraculous effect. In this 
regard amongst the verses he quotes are 40:78 which speaks of the apostle being sent with a 
sign and a divine permission, 2:102 where satanic beings caused mischief in Solomon’s 
kingdom by way of sorcery, here too God says he granted permission and verses pertaining to 
the mastery, preponderance and sweeping hegemony of prophetic power over all causes in 
all possible conditions (37:171‐173, ‘…most surely they shall be the assisted ones…’ and 58:21, 
134 See the short treatises of Ṭabāṭabāʾī entitled al rasāʾil al tawḥīdiyya. In this collection of four treatises (on the 
unity of God, the divine names, the divine acts and existential intermediaries), the treaty on intermediaries 
(Risālah al waṣāʾiṭ) discusses various intermediaries that fulfil an existential role between God and the natural 
realm. These intermediaries have been made existent one after the other according to their existential rank 
and manifestation which can be discerned by proofs and unveiled by spiritual wayfaring. The cosmology is 
distinctly theosophical and Akbārian (with a clear Neoplatonist antecedent), a cosmology that permits only one 
true, real existence, God and all other existents being mere entification or shadows that possess no real 
existence save by and through the real and unique singularity of God. Ṭabāṭabāʾī, M.H. al rasāʾil al tawḥīdiyya. 
(Qum: Mu᾽assassa Nashr al Islāmī, 1991), p. 108
135 He quotes) 10:3 ‘man za alladhi yashfaʿu ʿindahu illā bi idhnihi’ (who is he that he can intercede with him
save by his permission?)




                             
                             
                         
                                 
                       
                         
         
 
                               
                     
                       
                               
                     
                       
                         
     
 
                             
                               
                                     
                               
                                 
                           
                                         
                               
                                                 
  
        
                                 
                                   
                         
                             
                                       
                             
                                
                   
‘…I will most surely prevail, I and My apostle…’).138 Thus, it can be deduced that Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s 
exegesis highlights a cause beyond the natural, material order. It is of divine remit and 
hegemonic over lower, delimited, corruptible causes present in the material realm, and even 
abstract things too. This source is a spiritual, psychological one aided by the will of God which 
by definition can overpower a material impediment (miracles require impediments of matter 
to be removed generally speaking). Thus, any impediment is insignificant to prevent the 
supernatural act from taking place.139 
In the entirety of this discourse, the key point is the command of God being overarching, 
effective, immanent and direct. The Averroean distaste for emanation probably stemmed 
from his reading of Ghazālian remonstrations against Avicennan theories of necessity and 
emanation where God is seen to be constrained and unlike the God described by the Qurʾān. 
The analysis of  Ṭabāṭabāʾī  strikes a sympathetic tone with both Averroean and Ghazālian 
worlds despite acknowledging much of peripatetic thought. The argument is imbued with 
scriptural authority, something which the early peripatetics did not utilise in their explications 
with any distinction. 
The command (amr or permission, idhn) of God drives the Qurʾānic discourse on how God 
effects the contingent realm. This is epitomised in 36:82, his command is such that when he 
wills a thing he says to it ‘be!’ and it is, the word ‘be’ represents the existential creativity of 
God. It is not a word uttered defined by linguistic parameters, rather it is creative command 
that effects all causes. This will of god enshrined in his creative command defers all real agency 
to God and confers a relative, dependent, contingent agency to man. Sadra pertinently 
remarks that the relation of God to the world is not like a builder to a building or writing to a 
write but as speech is related to a speaker, speech ceases when the speaker stops speaking.140 
138 Al Mizān. vol 1. p. 83 
139 Ibid. p 83 
140 Rahman, Fazlur. The philosophy of Mulla Sadra Shīrāzī. (Chicago. Repr. 2005), p. 77. Sadrian ontology is 
critical of emanation as described by early peripatetics due to their insistence the contingents on the vertical 
scale are involved in causation (i.e. are causes for the existence of lower intelligences or bodies). Sadra draws 
much from the faqīr/ghanī distinction found in the Qurʾān in negating Avicennan/Farabian notions of 
intelligences creating other existences. Any contingent is essentially impoverished for its existence and it is 
absurd to scruple it can create or cause another existent. Sadra resolves the issue based on the key premise of 
existence (esse) being a simple, singular modulated reality that manifests aspects of itself whilst remaining 
unique, simple and simply being in essence (haqīqah wāḥidah mushakkika or a famed Sadrian phrase, basīṭ al 
haqīqah kull al ashyāʾ, the simple reality of all things).
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Off course,  Ṭabāṭabāʾī explains, the will of man is preserved in the sense despite all effects 
being contingent upon God’s will, human action is based on the volitional will of man himself 
directly and indirectly on the will of God, both human action and will are under the creative 
command of God which is the existential imperative of ‘Be!’. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī agrees that all events fit into the causal nexus and governed by natural laws be 
they commonplace or heterogeneous events. There is no distinction between positive events 
such as miracles or malevolent such as sorcery and magic. All natural events are dependent 
upon the will of God. They either coincide or are united with this will and command. All 
natural causes are impotent in instantiated an effect without the will and permission of God 
being, real efficacy and agency, lies in this existential force (idhā taḥaqaqa al idhn wa al ʾamr 
taḥaqaqat ʿan asbābihā, wa idhā lam yataḥaqaq al idhn wa al amr lam tataḥaqaq). All events 
are on par on this basis, miraculous or not.141 The prophet or sincere believer can perform 
seemingly supernatural events on the basis of this extra necessitating factor, the decisive 
command of God which has hegemony over all other causes. In a nutshell there is a cause for 
everything and causes are hierarchical with the permit and command of God being all 
encompassing. Off this command and will needs further clarification, is it a belligerent 
hegemony of power epitomised in Asharite theistic determinism or a self‐consumed 
intellectual inactivity defined in Averroean deistic determinism? Fakhry discusses this issue 
thoroughly, stating both tangents do not permit the fullness of the godhead to be expressed 
in terms that vouchsafe his undisputed attributes of power and wisdom yet fulfil the 
prerogatives of the causal dilemma arguing bother averroist0asharite positions have their 
merits albeit unsatisfactory and inconsistent. 142 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī  reiterates, all events, extra‐ordinary or natural, do not diverge from the causal 
principle and they are preceded by metaphysical causes. The argument resonates with the 
Ghazālian endeavours to rationally insert miracles into the causal order based on theories of 
lapsed time or occult causes or things being subject to a myriad of determinations although 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī differs on issues such as the Asharite claim natural causes inert as mentioned 
earlier on the discussion of natures and the decreed measure. The Qurʾān continuously 
141 Al Mizān. vol 1. p. 84 
142 Fakhry. p. 141 
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mentions the triumphant and insurmountable act of God that is embodied in his will and 
command.  Ṭabāṭabāʾī  renders this as the invincible cause of a miracle (sabab ghayr 
maghlūb).143 He goes on to differentiate between various causes and their effects: 
 normal events that are mutual necessities of apparent causes and invariably accompanied 
by concrete material causes that have the command and will of God associated with them 
(umūr ʿ ādiyya mulāzimah li asbāb ẓāhiriyya tuṣāḥibuhā al asbāb al ḥaqīqiyyah al ṭabīʿīyyah 
ghāliban aw maʿa aghlab) 
 Extraordinary events of an evil nature such as divination and sorcery or of a good nature 
such as the answering of prayers. These are based on natural causes that are unusual and 
irregular albeit based on a concrete cause that has the permission and will of God. 
However, positive or negative extraordinary events mentioned above are not wrought to 
vindicate a claim of any sort. 
 Miracles that challenge others and vindicate a truth claim such as prophethood. These, as 
all other events are based on natural concrete causes associated with the divine will and 
authorisation. The last two categories (extraordinary events – khwāriq al  ʿāda) have an 
insurmountable and incontrovertible cause in contrast to ordinary natural phenomena 
which have surmountable causes (al qismayn al ākhīrayn yufāriqān sāʾir al aqsām fī anna 
sababahumā lā yuṣīr maghlūban maqhūran qaṭṭ bi khilāf sāʾir al musabababāt)144 
The essence of the miracle is not determined by an occult cause rather, it is the fact that its
cause is insurmountable and detached from the ordinary occurrence (ghayr maqhūr aw
maghlūb) otherwise one can argue if a occult cause is discovered, the miracle would be rendered 
null and void and knowledge of it would entail invalidity of any claims associated with that 
miracle. Ṭabāṭabāʾī uses the example of a sick person cured by the supplication of a believer, 
the cure could have been medical but this ordinary method was surmounted by an 
extraordinary one. The miracle was in in the hegemonic cause of prayer healing rather than 
the conventional medical route.145 At this juncture,  Ṭabāṭabāʾī  proceeds to discuss the 
143 Al Mizān. vol 1. p. 84. It could be argued that this is similar to the secondary cause vs primary cause 
argument that yes the fire does burn the cotton but this is a secondary cause and primarily it is the act of God
who is the direct cause. However as we have seen, Ṭabāṭabāʾī does not bring in a distinction here, he simple 
states the will, permission and command of God are united with the natural cause such that the real cause is 
God and the natural cause is predicated, instantiated or exists because of it being made efficacious by divine 
providence.
144 Al Mizān. vol 1. p. 84 
145 Ibid. p. 85
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probative force of miracles in substantiating Prophetic claims and not as general evidences. 






                         
                     
                               
                                       
                             
                                     
                               
                             
                       
                         
     
  
                             
                         
                         
                           
                             
                                     
                               
                           
                         
                                 
                   
 
                             
                       
                                 
                   
Conclusion 
All human beings without analysis can decipher that every natural phenomenon requires a 
cause notwithstanding the philosophical, theological or scientific background of the observer. 
Basic sense experience and intuition at the very minimal can assent to this. The attribution of 
an act to an agent on a material level is one aspect of the debate, the other is that presented 
by revealed scriptures. The staff of Moses becoming a serpent, the parting of seas, Jesus 
raising of the dead or curing the sick by a hand stroke or pebbles in the palm of Muḥammad 
praising God. From all of these extraordinary acts, the rational basis for a series of material 
events that yields such a heterogeneous conclusion is lacking. The snake is born of a 
reproductive process undergone by its progenitor, sickness is cured through a logical 
continuum of diagnosis and treatment and speech requires vocal apparatus for the production 
of audible communication.
 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, has broken down the issue of miracles and causation on two levels. Firstly by 
highlighting the shortcomings in appreciating the problem from all the available aspects and 
secondly the inability of the antagonist to appreciate the understanding of causation as 
expressed by the philosophers. The absence of a material cause for a phenomenon that 
average people are accustomed to leads to the erroneous supposition that a cause does not 
exist in the case of a miracle, rather it relies on no cause except the direct intervention of God 
and is purely random. Ghazālī  found this to be the only way to rationally affirm a miracle. 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī as his predecessors, asserts that the absence of a customary material cause is not 
an absolute nullification of causality nor invalidates a cause, rather, the nullification concerns 
the propriety and efficacy of a specific set of causes. The nullification of a specific does not 
qualify as evidence for the nullity of a general notion. 
In a miracle, some specific causes are abrogated, these are material causes our sense oriented 
minds are accustomed to observing and anticipate to occur. Ṭabāṭabāʾī mentions this in the 
exegesis of the verse relating to the fire becoming cool and peaceable for Ibrāhīm by virtue of 
an existential address command or decree that  Ṭabāṭabāʾī mentioned earlier) renting the 
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customary order where fire burns the human body146. This is ordinarily taken for granted in 
the natural, physical world which is expected to fall into place as clockwork. We are habituated 
to the working of nature in such a way by sense experience. Causality is never extensionally 
observed such as when fire meets cotton, we cannot see, observe or feel causation qua 
causation. A miracle is the effect of a cause veiled to the observer and that is its essential 
nature. 
The causation debate is fundamental because of its many implications impinging on or even 
defining the nature of God, man and cosmos. The determinists, fatalists and their respective 
opponents have all vied for a version that is logical and absolves God from all lack and 
imperfection. The controversy highlights the dynamicity, fecundity and diversity of Islamic 
intellectual life where wholescale structures, systems, ontologies and epistemologies are 
refined, defined and perfected in an evolutionary and processual dialectic.  Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 
uniquely represents the fullness of this debate due to the convergence of philosophical 
erudition and Qurʾānic master exegete in his person. The debate remains open and echoing 
the celebrated adage of a bygone sage, it is a matter between the two matters (al ʾamr bayn 
al  ʾamrayn), neither staunch occasionalism where the real, unreal and divine are isolated 
entities actin and being acted upon whimsically nor absolute determinist causality where 
logical analysis exhausts being of its unfathomable depth, breadth and mystery. 
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